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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I discuss how the allocation of human capital, in the
form of education, across groups and sectors impacts economic development.
Particularly, in Chapter 2, I provide evidence that improvements in life ex-
pectancy achieved along the 20th century impeded countries from moving
toward more market-oriented labor regulations. First, using declines in pre-
dicted mortality from medical advances in the 1940s and 1950s as an instru-
ment for improvements in life expectancy, the chapter shows that improve-
ments in health cause an decrease in the share of the skilled labor force.
These low-skilled workers increase the political support for labor regulation
since they can bargain for higher wages when the cost of worker replacement
is higher. Cross-country data shows that countries with a larger share of low-
skilled workers failed to make their labor regulation more flexible. Lastly, I
show that health improvements in the 1940s and 1950s have a positive long-
run effect on the index of labor regulation.
In Chapter 3, exploiting heterogeneity across Brazilian micro-regions over
the 1970-2000 period, Parente, Rios-Neto and I examine whether the demo-
graphic dividend extends beyond a pure accounting effect. Using a Sys-GMM
approach, we find evidence that changes in age structure have only pure ac-
counting effects after controlling for human capital. Therefore, in the case
of Brazilian micro-regions, there is a second demographic dividend, which is
associated with education. This second dividend is the far more important of
the two dividends in terms of economic growth. In a counterfactual exercise,
we show that the accounting effect is responsible for less that 10% of the
income gap between the poorest and richest regions in Brazil.
In Chapter 4, I show that large governments hinder economic development
by reducing competition in the private sector. The model features a public
sector that uses human capital to provide public goods that reduce costs
in the private sector, increasing competition. However, large governments
ii
reduce market competition by reducing the supply of human capital in the
private sector. The model produces the empirical finding that government
size has an inverted-U relationship with economic growth. The model also
stresses the importance of public sector productivity. Using data from Eu-
ropean countries, a calibrated version of the model shows that the average
gap in income to the US in 30 years would be 87% instead of 74% if all
countries in the sample had the same public sector productivity of Finland,
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Human capital refers to the productivity embedded to the labor force as an
outcome of experience and investment in education and health. The term
was popularized by Gary Becker (1962) and Theodore Schultz (1961) in the
1960s and soon drew the attention of development economists as a potential
explanation for the level of international income disparities. Either as the
engine of growth, as suggested by Robert Lucas (1988), or as a critical type
of investment, as pointed out by Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David
Weil (1992), human capital plays a key role accounting for development across
countries.
Human capital also plays a critical role in a specific subset of the literature
on economic growth: the unified growth theory. This theory, formalized by
Oded Galor and Weil (2000), has the quantity-vs-quality trade-off1 triggering
the demographic transition, a key phenomenon for the take-off from stagnant
to modern economies. Nonetheless, investments in education are motivated
by technological progress. Alternatively, as proposed by Yoram Ben-Porath
(1967), increasing years of schooling can be induced by improvements in
longevity as the returns from education rise as individuals live longer. In
Chapter 2, I provide evidence that, although improvements in health may
yshift the distribution of years of schooling to the right, the share of skilled
individuals in the economy decreases, leading to a decline of the average
years of schooling. As a corollary, I show that a larger share of unskilled
individuals induce stronger demand for more strict labor regulation, along
the lines of the works of Gilles Saint-Paul (2000). In this sense, increases in
life expectancy may rise barriers to development.
Still regarding the long-run process of development of nations, the distri-
bution of human capital across age groups is important to understand the
effects of demographic dividends on the economy. The demographic dividend
1See Becker and Gregg Lewis (1973).
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is an outcome of the demographic transition. It is simply an increase in the
share of working-age population resulting from the delayed decline in fertil-
ity rates that follows declines in mortality rates during the transition. One
would expect the dividend to rise income per capita as the number of workers
increases given a constant population size. This is what is called the transla-
tion or accounting effect. However, in an influential work, David Bloom and
Jeffrey Williamson (1998) suggest that the East Asian economic miracles are
an outcome of the demographic dividend. Moreover, the dividend contains a
productivity effect beyond the translation effect. Additionally, Jesu´s Crespo
Cuaresma, Wolfgang Lutz and Warren Sanderson (2014) provide evidence
that the productivity effects found by Bloom and Williamson (1998) are in
fact prompted by education as the younger cohorts composing the labor force
are more likely to possess more years of schoolings.
Together with Stephen Parente and Eduardo Rios Neto, I test the effects of
demographic dividends in Brazilian regions. We show that Brazilian regions
are at different stages in the process of development. Namely, Northeast
and North are behind in the process compared with the rest of the country.
These regional differences allow us to test the effects of the dividend on
the regional economies. We provide evidence in favor of the argument put
forth by Cuaresma et al. (2014). Education drives any effect of the dividend
beyond the translation effect. Moreover, the translation effect is small and
explains only 5% of the regional differences in income per capita in Brazil.
The distribution of human capital across sectors is also important to un-
derstand international income disparities. As argued by William Baumol
(1996), talent can be unproductive or even destructive if allocated in rent-
seeking or crime. Along this lines, I investigate the sectoral allocation of
human capital and its effects on economic growth. In particular, I explore
how the reallocation of human capital from the production of private to pub-
lic goods affect incentives that firms have to invest in innovation. I find that
low provision of public goods are detrimental to growth as it increases the
cost of production. However, large provision of public goods is also detri-
mental to economic growth as it reduces the stock of human capital available
for private firms.
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1.1 Measuring Human Capital
Throughout this dissertation the terms human capital and years of schooling
will be used interchangeably. The reason for the close relatedness among
them stem from the fact that education is more often associated with labor
productivity than experience or health, although these are also important
factors. More importantly, I follow the vast literature that accounts for the
participation of human capital on development. Robert Hall and Charles
Jones (1999) and Francesco Caselli (2005) are examples of this line of research
where the per capita stock of human capital, defined as h, is computed as
h = eφ(yrs),




0.134× yrs yrs ≤ 4
0.134× 4 + 0.101× (yrs− 4) 4 < yrs ≤ 8
0.134× 4 + 0.101× 4 + 0.068× (yrs− 8) 8 < yrs
,
where the values are rates of returns to education computed for low-, middle-
and high-income countries.
The rationale behind this functional form for the stock of human capital
comes from the Mincerian equation where the logarithm of labor productiv-
ity – measured as relative wages – are a function of the years of schooling:
lnh = φ(yrs).2 Note, however, that this formulation assumes a perfect
substitutability among education groups. It means that a finite number of
workers with zero years of schooling can perform the same job as one worker
with college education. An alternative formulation that accommodates dif-
ferent levels of substitutability among education levels is suggested by Caselli
and Wilbur Coleman (2006) and applied, for example, by Jong Wha Lee and
Hanol Lee (2016). Throughout this dissertation, I use Hall and Jones (1999)
formulation, although Caselli and Coleman (2006) formulation is often used
to verify the robustness of the results.
2Although the stepwise functional form of φ(·) is more common in the literature, its
not uncommon to find a linear formulation where φ(yrs) = 0.101× yrs.
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Given the discussion above, average years of schooling is the only data
required to build the stock of human capital. However, this data is not readily
available, specially if we want to proceed with cross-country comparisons. In
order to build such data set one needs to rely on census data, which usually do
not include the years of schooling of individuals, but the education attained
by them. Moreover, duration of each level of education attainment may very
both within and across countries. Luckily, Robert Barro and Jong Wha Lee
collected the required data and proceeded with the many adjustments needed
to build an internationally comparable data set on average years of education
(Barro and Lee, 2013).3 In general, they build seven categories of education:
no education, primary incomplete, primary complete, secondary incomplete,
secondary complete, college incomplete and college complete, where `i with
i ∈ I = {u, pi, pc, si, sc, hi, hc} is the share of individuals in working-age
population in each category, respectively. The average years of schooling of





where dj is the duration in years of the education category j. In this disser-
tation I either compute the average years of schooling accordingly or use the
data provided by Barro and Lee (2013) or Lee and Lee (2016), which is an
extension of Barro and Lee (2013) to dates prior to 1950s.
3The first version of the project dates back to 1993 (Barro and Lee, 1993) and was
subject to many improvements throughout the years. See for example Daniel Cohen and
Laura Leker (2007) critiques accommodated in the 2013 version.
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CHAPTER 2
HEALTH REVOLUTION AND BARRIERS
TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
In the 20th century, many countries experienced what Deaton (2013) called
a great escape. Economic development helped societies reduce poverty and
starvation. Medical advances and the creation of international organizations
helped many countries increase the life expectancy of their populations. Al-
though both phenomena are observed in the majority of nations, their pace
seems to differ.
As Becker et al. (2005) stresses, while economic development struggles
to spread across developing countries, health has improved faster in poor
countries than in rich countries. This fact is depicted in Fig. 2.1. For different
samples and time horizons, it is clear that the dispersion in GDP per capita
either increased or did not change significantly since the 1900s. While the
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) sample features relatively constant dispersion
around 5, The samples that use the Penn World Tables data suggest an
important increase in the dispersion of income per capita. In 1960, the data
pointed that the country in the 90th percentile was richer than the country in
the 10th percentile by a factor of 15, this number doubles in 2000 and remains
close to 30 in 2010. On the other hand, all samples suggest a decrease in
dispersion of life expectancy. While, using Acemoglu and Johnson (2007)
sample, the country in 90th percentile would have more than the double of
life expectancy of the country in the 10th percentile, this factor declines to
close to 1.2 in 2000. The other samples suggest a similar decline.
Importantly, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and Cervellati and Sunde
(2011a) find evidence that increased life expectancy has either nil or nega-
tive effects on economic performance. This chapter will focus on this case for
which the empirical observation that there is a negative association between
increased life expectancy and growth is puzzling, especially through the lens
of the literature on the effects of health on economic growth. In models that
propose a positive relation between health and income per capita, the main
5
Figure 2.1: Evolution of the dispersion in per capita income and life
expectancy
Note: Dispersion defined as the 90th percentile over the 10th percentile. Four
alternative samples: AJ means Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), PWT means Penn World
Tables, PTW60 is PTW starting in the 1960 and UN is United Nations. N is the
number of observations in each sample.
channels are increases in the accumulation of human capital (Ben-Porath,
1967; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002; Lee and Mason, 2010; Hansen and Strulik, 2017),
a change in fertility behavior (Soares, 2005), and direct increases in worker
productivity (Bloom et al., 2004; Weil, 2007). Microeconomic evidence also
suggest a positive relationship between health and schooling (Jayachandran
and Lleras-Muney, 2009; Olson, 2009).
In this chapter I provide a closer examination on the relationship between
improvements in health and education. In particular, I use the same stage
of the epidemiological transition used by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) to
identify the effects of life expectancy on average years of schooling. Although
this relationship was explored by many researchers, including Acemoglu and
Johnson (2006), I add to this topic in two ways: first I use data collected by
Lee and Lee (2016) that allows me to control for initial years of schooling;
second I accomodate critiques to the approach used by Acemoglu and John-
son (2007) on their original paper, namely, I control for initial life expectancy
(Aghion et al., 2011; Bloom et al., 2014). The results show that increases in
life expectancy are negatively associated with average years of schooling. It
contrasts with Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) and Hansen (2013) that find
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no effect.1
Again, this result is at odds with many theoretical results. The famous
Ben-Porath effect predicts that longevity increases the returns to educational
investment increasing years of schooling (Ben-Porath, 1967). Along these
lines, Soares (2005) suggests that larger returns to education also triggers
the quantity-vs-quality trade-off and the decline of fertility. To reconcile
theory and evidence, Cervellati and Sunde (2011b) suggest that the lack of
relationship between life expectancy and development stems from a sample
of countries in different stages of the demographic transition. Countries in
early stages are impacted negatively by improved health – as the income ef-
fect translates into higher fertility – whereas post-transition countries benefit
from increases in life expectancy. In this chapter, I do not find contrasting
effects for these groups.
Alternatively, to understand my results, one needs to recall that life ex-
pectancy is composed by mortality rates of all age groups. In that sense,
increases in mortality can stem from declines in mortality by any age cohort.2
The improvements in health explored in this chapter are mainly driven by
decreases in young cohorts mortality rates, especially in developing coun-
tries (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2006; Lorentzen et al., 2008; Deaton, 2013).3
Therefore, together with increases in life expectancy, we need to investigate
decrease in child and infant mortality that, according to Doepke (2005), in-
crease net fertility.
More importantly, improvements in life expectancy are likely to affect in-
dividuals differently, according to their income and education group. Using
Census data collected from the IPUMS International, I show that the ratio
children surviving to children ever born have increased substantially in low-
education groups since the 1970s. It suggests that improvements in health are
more beneficial for low-educated groups. Therefore, these groups are likely
to increase their net fertility more than high-educated individuals. Assuming
that low-educated individuals find more difficult to educate their offspring
1Interestingly, Hansen (2013) and Cohen and Leker (2014) find positive effects on young
cohorts.
2Although the effect of adult mortality is stronger when infant and child mortalities
are low.
3Researches that explicitly investigate the relationship between adult mortality and
development usually find positive effects (Lorentzen et al., 2008; Hazan, 2012; Hansen and
Strulik, 2017). However, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) show that their result stands when
life expectancy at 20 is used.
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(Kremer and Chen, 2002; Moav, 2005), the improvement in life expectancy
analyzed in this chapter would lead to a larger share of low-educated indi-
viduals in the economy and, hence, a decline in average years of schooling. I
also show the decline in the share of skilled individuals empirically.
Next, I check whether the decline in human capital induced by increases
in life expectancy can explain the lack of convergence observed in the 20th
century. Using a semi-elasticity between life expectancy and years of school-
ing equal to -7 – an intermediate values among all estimates – I show that
middle-income countries would have caught up with rich countries in the
stock of human capital per capita if life expectancy had no effect on years of
schooling. However, this increase in human capital would not be enough to
promote a catch up in income per capita.
I, then, propose a link between the share of skilled workers and productiv-
ity: The rise of barriers to development in form of labor regulation induced
by the share of skilled workers. As suggested by Saint-Paul (2000), a strug-
gle of classes takes place in the 20th century between unskilled workers and
skilled workers. On one hand, unskilled workers demand stricter labor regu-
lation to increase the cost of replacement and, hence, their bargaining power.
On the other hand, skilled workers already have high bargaining power given
their expertise and would benefit from more unskilled worker in the labor
force. Therefore, the share of unskilled workers is crucial for the political
determination of labor regulation as they are the winners from this policy.
An example of this mechanism is presented by Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).
The authors put forth a model where workers choose to block child labor
since children increase the supply of unskilled workers, undermining wages.
Also following similar intuition, Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Dinlersoz and
Greenwood (2016) claim that reductions in the power of unions are due to
skill-biased technology that increased the competitive market return of skilled
workers. Consequently, skilled workers broke the coalition with unskilled
workers, weakening the unions.
Finally I use cross-country data and instrumental variable to check the
feasibility of that hypothesis. I find that there is a strong negative correlation
between the share of skilled workers and the strictness of the labor regulation.
Countries with smaller initial share of skilled labor have failed to reduce the
burden of labor regulation. I also show that this relationship can be tracked
to improvements in health in the 1940s and 1950s, although the findings are
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weak given data availability.
After this introduction, I show evidence that increases in life expectancy
reduce the average years of education. Then, in Section 3, I show evidence
that increases in life expectancy imply a decreasing share of skilled workers.
In Section 4, I show that these reductions in human capital are not enough
to explain the lack in convergence. Then, in Section 5, I show the facts about
the evolution of labor regulation and its relationship with improvements in
health. Conclusions are in Section 6.
2.1 Health and Education
In this section, I revisit the question on how improvements in life expectancy
due to medical advances that happened in the 1940s and 1950s impact aver-
age years of schooling. This question was explored by Acemoglu and Johnson
(2006) and Hansen (2013), however, the lack of long-run data on education
at the time avoided the proper control to initial values. Moreover, the de-
bate on this question since 2006 have improved the estimation of the results
(Aghion et al., 2011; Bloom et al., 2014; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2014).
Improvement in life expectancy is a well document fact of the 20th cen-
tury. Important medical innovations in the 1940s played an important role
in the eradication of many diseases around the world, including Pneumonia,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007). According to the
Ben-Porath (1967) effect, these increases in life expectancy should lead to
increases in average years of schooling. However, Fig. 2.2 depicts a different
scenario. Panel (a) uses data from Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) starting in
1940. However, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) have a limited sample which
I expand using United Nations data starting in 1950. Both panels show
that improvements in health reduce the average years of schooling in subse-
quent years. The data on years of education is from Lee and Lee (2016) and
contains only individuals between 25 and 65 years of age.
To formally test this relationship I estimate the following fixed effect model
Avg. Years of Schoolingi,t+s = α+β log(Life Expectancy)i,t
+ γ′controlsi,t + ηi + µt + i,t,
(2.1)
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Figure 2.2: Changes in life expectancy and years of schooling
Note: AJ means Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and UN is United Nations.
where ηi are country fixed effects, µt are time fixed effects and s is the period
it takes for life expectancy to affect the average years of schooling in the
economy.
I follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) in taking advantage of major medi-
cal advances that happened in between the 1940s and 1950s as an exogenous
shock on life expectancy. I use the same variable proposed by the authors as




[(1− Id,t)Mdi,1940 + Id,tMdF,t],
where D is the set of 15 killer diseases whose treatments improved after the
1940s.4 Mdi,1940 is the mortality from disease d in country i in year 1940,
Id,t is a dummy that takes value one if there was a medical intervention for
disease d and MdF,t is the mortality from disease d in the “frontier” country,
i.e., the country with lower mortality from that disease.
The intervention dummy is the same for all countries, that is, once the
treatment for a disease is discovered all countries are potentially treated
(Intention to Treat). Heterogeneity is increased due to the intensity of treat-
ment, captured by Mdi,1940. Countries affected by a given disease will benefit
the most from medical advances on that disease. The identifying assump-
4The diseases are tuberculosis, malaria, pneumonia, influenza, cholera, typhoid, small-
pox, whooping cough, measles, diphtheria, scarlet fever, yellow fever, plague, typhus fever,
and dysentery/diarrhea-related diseases. See Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) for details.
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tion is that Mdi,1940 is exogenous given that there was no treatment for the
illnesses studied here. Therefore, cov(Mdi,1940, i,t) = 0 for all d and t.
Data on life expectancy and mortality by diseases are from Acemoglu and
Johnson (2007), being the Vital Statistics Demographic Yearbook published
by the United Nations the primary source. This Yearbook encompasses only
a restricted number of countries. Moreover, as in Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007), I drop African and Ex-soviet countries due to the quality of data.
Data on education is from Lee and Lee (2016). In total there are 47 countries
in the sample.5
Since I focus on health improvements that occurred within a brief period,
namely, 1940 to 1960, I set a panel with only two periods per country. There-
fore, the within-group estimator of β in Eq. (2.1) is the same as β in
∆Avg. Years of Schoolingi,1940+s−1960+s = β∆ log(Life Expectancy)i,1940−1960
+ γ′∆controlsi,1940−1960 + ∆µ1940−1960 + ∆i,1940−1960.
The coefficient β estimated using a two-stage least squares with country
and time fixed effects for s ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40} is presented in Fig. 2.3. As
suggested by Andrews et al. (2018), the confidence interval plotted in the
figure is the Anderson-Rubin 95% confidence set which is efficient under
weak instruments.6 Improvements in life expectancy have negative effects
on the average years of schooling. The effect is low in the contemporaneous
period (1940-1960) and the 1950-1970 timespan. It increases in the 1960-1980
reaching its lower values and vanishes subsequently.
Nonetheless, the estimates presented in Fig. 2.3 do not control for any
initial condition. To answer the critiques posed by Aghion et al. (2011) and
Bloom et al. (2014) one must control for initial life expectancy. However, as
pointed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2014) controlling for life expectancy in
5The baseline sample includes the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Germany, Denmark, Ecuador, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece,
Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Italy, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Mexico,
Myanmar, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Paraguay, El Salvador, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay, United
States and Venezuela.
6According to Andrews et al. (2018), the Anderson-Rubin confidence set is optimal
in the case of weak instruments and it is equivalent to the usual t-test if instrument are
strong.
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Figure 2.3: β estimates of Eq. (2.1) with no controls for
s ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40}.
Note: Shaded area: Anderson-Rubin 95% confidence set.
1940 is inconsistent since it is highly correlated with the instrument. There-
fore, we follow the authors in using life expectancy in 1900 as a proxy for
initial life expectancy. Moreover, as pointed out by Cohen and Leker (2014),
average years of schooling present persistence since is very unlikely that in-
dividual above 25 years of age will not increase their years of schooling. One
then needs to account for differences in the initial average years of school-
ing. I also present the results including a variable whether a country is
post demographic transition, as suggested by Cervellati and Sunde (2011b).
Estimations are presented either in long-differences
∆Avg. Years of Schoolingi,1940−s = β∆ log(Life Expectancy)i,1940−s
+ γ′∆controlsi,1940−s + ∆µ1940−s + ∆i,1940−1960,
where s ∈ {1980, 2000} or Fixed effect estimates from a panel with the 47
countries and years ranging from 1930 to 2000 are also presented. In this
case, initial average years of schooling refers to the lagged years of schooling.
Table 2.1 depicts the result.
Life expectancy reduces the average year of schooling. The coefficients are
substantially robust across estimation methods and increase in absolute val-
ues as controls are added. One can observe that, in general, the Kleibergen-
Paap rk suggests strong instruments, although this statistics declines as con-
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Table 2.1: Dependent variable: Average years of schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Long Difference 1940-1980
Log(Life Expectancy) -3.91∗ -5.30∗ -8.30∗ -11.97∗
(1.01) (1.69) (3.73) (5.61)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 47.74 21.58 4.76 2.64
AR test (p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.06
Panel B: Long Difference 1940-2000
Log(Life Expectancy) -2.03∗ -3.88∗ -8.56∗ -10.44∗
(1.14) (2.24) (3.73) (4.94)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 61.62 26.08 8.13 5.39
AR test (p-value) 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.05
Inital Life Expectancy No Yes Yes Yes
Initial Share of Skilled Workers No No Yes Yes
Demographic Transition No No No Yes
Panel C: Panel 1940-1980
Log(Life Expectancy) -3.97∗ -5.77∗ -6.50∗ -3.71∗
(0.83) (1.26) (2.22) (1.47)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 48.69 9.74 3.25 2.66
AR test (p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.07
Panel D: Panel 1940-2000
Log(Life Expectancy) -3.43∗ -5.59∗ -7.53∗ -2.90∗
(0.84) (1.42) (2.15) (1.22)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 57.24 12.48 4.50 3.75
AR test (p-value) 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07
Trend Life Expectancy No Yes Yes Yes
Trend Share of Skilled Workers No No Yes Yes
Lag Share of Skilled Workers No No No Yes
Countries 47 47 47 47
2SLS regression using the predicted mortality as instrument for life ex-
pectancy. All columns control for country and time fixed effects. Data
on life expectancy and predicted mortality are from Acemoglu and John-
son (2007). Data on average years of schooling is from Lee and Lee
(2016). Demographic transition indicator variable from Cervellati and
Sunde (2011b).
Robust standard errors clustered in countries. Standard errors within
parenthesis. * p-value< 0.1.
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trols are added. Nonetheless, the Anderson-Rubin test is consistent under
weak instruments and always delivery the same results as the standard con-
fidence intervals. My most preferred estimate are provided by the Panel C
or D in column (4). They are controlled for the trend in life expectancy and
the persistence of years of schooling. They delivery a point estimate between
-6.5 and -7.53 meaning that an 10% increase in life expectancy decreases the
average years of schooling in between 0.29 and 0.37.
2.2 Differential Effects of Life Expectancy
In this section, I show that the improvement in health throughout the 20th
century did not spread evenly among populations. Individuals with higher
education levels were more likely to provide healthy environments and afford
treatment to their children (Castello´-Climent and Dome´nech, 2008). There-
fore, as depicted in Fig. 2.4, individuals in households with less educated
mothers experienced higher increases in survival rates measured by the ratio
surviving children to children ever born.
As stressed by Doepke (2005), extended versions of Barro and Becker
(1989) predict that increases in survival rates of children lead to increases in
the number of surviving children. Recall that improvements in health ana-
lyzed in this chapter are mostly led by declines in mortality rates of young
cohorts. Therefore, one should expect that this increases in life expectancy
would lead to larger net fertility, especially for low-educated individuals.
Moreover, given that low-skilled parents are less likely to educate their
offspring (Kremer and Chen, 2002; Moav, 2005) countries that experienced
higher improvement in life expectancy should have a higher share of low-
skilled individuals. Fig. 2.5 speaks to this point. It shows that countries that
had higher increases in life expectancy between 1940 and 1960 (1950 and
1970) experienced lower increases in the share of skilled workers between
1940 and 1980 (1950 and 1990). Moreover, the R2 of this relationship is 0.34
(0.24). The share of skilled workers in the economy is the share of individual
between 25 and 65 years of age who completed at least secondary education.
The data was collected by Lee and Lee (2016). The data for life expectancy
is from Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) (United Nations, 2017).
As before, I test this relationship formally using exactly the same strategy.
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Figure 2.4: Survival rates for groups of education
Note: Survival rates are the number of surviving children over the number of children
ever born alive. Data from demographic censuses. IPUMS International.
15
Figure 2.5: Changes in life expectancy and share of skiiled workers
Note: AJ means Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and UN is United Nations (2017).
First, I show the effect of the health shock on subsequent decades. The
within-group estimator of β in Eq. (2.1) – with the share of skilled workers as
dependent variable – is presented in Fig. 2.6. As expected, improvements in
life expectancy have negative effects on the share of skilled individuals. The
effect is low in the contemporaneous period (1940-1960) and increases when
the newborns from 1940s enter the workforce (25 years-old in our definition).
The effect is even stronger when individuals born in the 1950s also enter the
workforce. The effect diminishes in 1970-1990 and is statistically zero for the
period 1980-2000.
Again, the estimates presented in Fig. 2.6 do not control for initial con-
ditions. Thefore, fixed effect estimates from a panel with the 47 countries
and years ranging from 1930 to 2000 are presented in Table 2.2. The re-
sults are even stronger than the ones presented in Table 2.1. Increases in
life expectancy reduce the share of skilled workers in the economy. Again,
the result is consistent to different methods and addition of different con-
trols. Using our most preferred estimates, a 10% increase the life expectancy
reduces the share of skilled workers in between 3.7 to 4.23 percentage points.
The evidence documented in this section provides an explanation for the
negative effects of life expectancy on average years of education. It happens
through the increase in the share of low-skilled workers, which, in turn, is
driven by differential effects of life expectancy in education groups. The
follow-up question is whether the negative effects of a smaller share of skilled
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Table 2.2: Dependent variable: Share of skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Long Difference 1940-1980
Log(Life Expectancy) -69.15∗ -60.61∗ -44.28∗ -55.06∗
(10.33) (15.72) (15.71) (21.76)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 47.74 21.58 14.46 7.86
AR test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Panel B: Long Difference 1940-2000
Log(Life Expectancy) -67.06∗ -65.59∗ -61.62∗ -68.87∗
(9.49) (23.03) (26.61) (35.56)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 61.62 26.08 19.32 12.03
AR test (p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07
Inital Life Expectancy No Yes Yes Yes
Initial Share of Skilled Workers No No Yes Yes
Demographic Transition No No No Yes
Panel C: Panel 1940-1980
Log(Life Expectancy) -48.21∗ -51.56∗ -31.73∗ -15.78∗
(8.71) (18.60) (12.72) (8.95)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 48.69 9.74 6.77 5.84
AR test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06
Panel D: Panel 1940-2000
Log(Life Expectancy) -56.30∗ -58.04∗ -42.26∗ -12.69∗
(7.46) (17.81) (14.88) (6.82)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 57.24 12.48 9.05 8.02
AR test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08
Trend Life Expectancy No Yes Yes Yes
Trend Share of Skilled Workers No No Yes Yes
Lag Share of Skilled Workers No No No Yes
Countries 47 47 47 47
2SLS regression using the predicted mortality as instrument for life ex-
pectancy. All columns control for country and time fixed effects. Data
on life expectancy and predicted mortality are from Acemoglu and John-
son (2007). Data on average years of schooling is from Lee and Lee
(2016). Demographic transition indicator variable from Cervellati and
Sunde (2011b).
Robust standard errors clustered in countries. Standard errors within
parenthesis. * p-value< 0.1.
17
Figure 2.6: β estimates of Eq. (2.1) with no controls for
s ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40} and share of skilled workers as dependent variable
Note: Shaded area: Anderson-Rubin 95% confidence set.
workers on the economy stems only by the reduced stock of human capital.
2.3 A Counter-factual Exercise
In this section present a counter-factual exercise where increases in life ex-
pectancy have no negative effects on the average years of schooling. By doing
this, we can assess what are the costs of life expectancy to income per capita.
I compute the counter-factual evolution of human capital as
∆ ¯yrst = ∆yrst + β∆ log(lexp)t,
where ¯yrst is the counter-factual average years of schooling, yrst is the ob-
served years of schooling and lexpt is the observed life expectancy. β is set
equal to 7 as an intermediate semi-elasticity estimated in Table 2.1. The
results are depicted in Fig. 2.7
As one can observe in Panel (a), rich countries were less harmed by in-
creases in life expectancy in terms of GDP per capita than middle income
countries. Panel (b) highlights the reason: the increases in life expectancy
in middle income countries are substantially larger than in rich countries,
especially in the 1940s and 1950s. In fact, this increases are important to
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Figure 2.7: Counter-factual exercise
Note: Rich are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, UK,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and USA. Middle are Argentina, Austria, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico,
Russia, Singapore, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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explain disparities in average years of schooling between rich and middle in-
come countries, as depict in Panel (c) and (d). The conclusion is that, even
though, health improvement can explain the gap in education between rich
and middle income countries, closing this gap would explain only a small
share of the gap in income per capita. In the next section, I suggest a chan-
nel by which the share of skilled workers can explain the gap in income per
capita through total factor productivity.
2.4 Labor Regulation
As discussed in previous sections, health improvements achieved in the 1940s
and 1950s have decreased the share of skilled workers in the economies. How-
ever, this negative effect on the stock of human capital is not enough to ex-
plain the lack of convergence in income observed in the data. In this section,
I suggest that smaller shares of skilled workers in the labor force lead to more
stricter regulation. It is important since labor regulation increases produc-
tion costs, reduce the size of firms and productivity of skilled workers. For
example, Besley and Burgess (2004) provide evidence that pro-worker regu-
lation reduced firms production, employment, investment and productivity
in India.
Labor market relations between employers and employees go back to the
age of guilds where specific laws regulated the work of apprentices. However,
as noted by Engerman (2003), labor regulation in this period was created
by political elites to protect employers. For example, in England in the
fourteenth century, maximum wage laws were established because labor was
scarce after the Black Death (Engerman, 2003, p. 9). Labor regulation as we
know it today took form in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the
regulation of maximum hours of work was imposed on children and women.7
The diffusion of labor standards across countries is due to the creation of
the International Labor Organization in 1919 as an offshoot of the League of
Nations and was strengthened after the World War II. European countries
saw changes in labor regulations toward wage equality during the 1960s and
1970s along with the rise of welfare states. Take the example of Italy as
7Interestingly, these policies affected industrial sectors, especially textiles and mining,
and the agricultural sector was exempted.
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depicted by Siebert (1997, p. 40):
Italy followed a similar pattern of more regulated markets in the
1960s and into the 1970s. For example, in 1966, Italy first passed
regulations on firing procedures. By 1970, following waves of
strikes, these regulations were tightened to the point that firing
costs were almost infinite. However, as unemployment stayed
high in the 1970s, Italy authorized temporary work contracts in
1977, rules that it would liberalize in 1984 and 1987. Layoffs for
economic reasons were authorized in 1986, and firing restrictions
were eased for large firms in 1991. In 1992, Italy ended its practice
of synchronized wage bargaining across sectors of the economy
and the indexation of wage adjustments (the scala mobile).
To illustrate this pattern, I use data collected by the Fraser Institute on
Economic Freedom (Gwartney et al., 2017). Specifically, I use the sub-topic
Labor Market Regulation in years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 only
for countries that have that information for all periods. This reduces the
sample to basically Western Europeans countries, Western offshoots, Japan
and Argentina. Originally, the index assigns high values to countries with less
pro-worker regulation.8 However, I invert the index to indicate the strictness
of labor regulation.
One can observe in Fig. 2.8, Panel (a), the movement of labor regula-
tion toward the pro-market policies especially after the 1990s. However,
the disparity across countries also increases during this period. Panel (b)
give us a sense of which countries had policies that changed toward more
market-oriented regulation. In Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom their indexes were at low levels in 1970 and improved during this 40
year period. Among the countries with more stricter labor regulation in the
1970s, the USA, Denmark and Belgium stand out in improving their index
values. Spain, Greece, Portugal and Norway had low growth rate gains in
labor regulation index.
The previous analysis show that, in general, labor markets have moved
towards pro-market regulation, however, many countries failed to substan-
8In order to earn high marks in the component rating regulation of the labor market, a
country must allow market forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of hiring
and firing, and refrain from the use of conscription. One can refer to the approach applied
by the report here: https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/approach
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Figure 2.8: The evolution of labor regulation after 1970
Note: The labor regulation index is the sub-topic Labor Market Regulation in the
Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et al., 2017). Higher values mean more
pro-worker regulation.
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tially transform their regulations. The remaining question is whether we can
draw the same conclusion for other countries, especially developing coun-
tries, which are neglected in the previous analysis. To extend the sample I
set 1990 as the baseline year. Fig. 2.8, Panel (c), depicts the decreasing labor
regulation index since the 1990s. Panel (d) displays the index in 1990 and
in 2010. Note that a few developing countries appear among the countries
with better labor regulation both in 1990 and 2010, e.g., Malaysia and India.
Other had the index significantly decreased since 1990s for some, e.g., Russia
and Bolivia. Other developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela
and Turkey failed to decrease their labor regulation index and are at the top
of the distribution.
Given the theory discussed in the previous section, countries with higher
shares of skilled labor have a politically weaker working class unable to pre-
vent labor market deregulation. Fig. 2.9 speaks to this point. It shows that,
for countries with similar labor regulation in the initial period (only coun-
tries with a labor regulation index above 5), the variation in the initial share
of low-skilled workers explains substantial variation in the labor regulation
in 2010. Importantly, countries with lower shares of skilled workers in the
initial period have stricter regulation in 2010. Specifically, in Panel (a) the
variation in the share of skilled workers in 1970 explains 48% of variation in
labor regulation in 2010. In a more heterogeneous sample with the initial
year being 1990, the variation in the share of skilled workers explains 25% of
the labor regulation in 2010.
To formally test whether improvements in health affect labor regulation,
I use a similar strategy as in Section 2. The main obstacle here is the lack
of data on regulation prior to 1970s. In fact, for years earlier than 1990 the
sample of countries covered by Gwartney et al. (2017) is very small. However,
this is the best strategy available since one can argue that 30 years is a
reasonable period for increases in life expectancy to affect labor regulation.
Going beyond this point is probably troublesome. Therefore I test the effect
of life expectancy in the time horizon of 30 years. Given that it would take
two decades for life expectancy to affect the share of unskilled workers and
that this effect is relatively persistent, we should be able to observe effects
of labor regulation at this long time horizon.
As in Section 2, I estimate the following fixed effects model
23
Figure 2.9: Initial share of skilled workers and labor regulation index
Note: Sample of countries with labor regulation index above 5. Share of skilled workers
are defined as the share of individuals between 25 and 65 years of age with at least
secondary education from Lee and Lee (2016). The labor regulation index is the
sub-topic Labor Market Regulation in the Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney
et al., 2017). Higher values mean more pro-worker regulation.
Labor regulationi,t+30 = α+β log(Life Expectancy)i,t
+ γ′controlsi,t + ηi + µt + i,t,
(2.2)
where ηi are country fixed effects, µt are time fixed effects. The estimates of
β for t ∈ {1940, 1980} are equivalent to
∆Labor Regulationi,1970−2010 = β∆ log(Life Expectancy)i,1940−1980
+ γ′∆controlsi,1940−1980 + ∆µ1940−1980 + ∆i,1940−1980.
The number of countries with data available for the period 1970-2010 is
only 20.9 Nonetheless, the sample includes countries considered rich and
middle income in 1940.
The results are presented in Table 2.3. Unfortunately the instruments for
this reduced sample are substantially weaker than using the complete sam-
9The countries in the baseline sample include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom,
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden and United States.
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Table 2.3: Life expectancy on labor regulation: Predicted mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Long Difference 1940-1980
Log(Life Expectancy) 6.21 8.11 12.79 14.01
(4.17) (11.13) (10.47) (11.94)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 5.15 3.04 2.44 1.74
AR test (p-value) 0.30 0.55 0.38 0.38
Inital Life Expectancy No Yes Yes Yes
Initial Share of Skilled Workers No No Yes Yes
Demographic Transition No No No Yes
Panel B: Panel 1940-1980
Log(Life Expectancy) 4.03 1.86 -8.60 19.28∗
(3.93) (18.04) (16.94) (10.86)
Kleibergen-Paap rk 5.22 0.55 0.50 2.13
AR test (p-value) 0.41 0.92 0.38 0.03
Trend Life Expectancy No Yes Yes Yes
Trend Share of Skilled Workers No No Yes Yes
Lag Share of Skilled Workers No No No Yes
Countries 19 19 19 19
1 2SLS regression using the predicted mortality as an instrument for life
expectancy. All columns control for country and time fixed effects. Data
on life expectancy and predicted mortality are from Acemoglu and John-
son (2007). Data on labor regulation is from Gwartney et al. (2017).
2 Robust standard errors clustered in countries within parenthesis. *
p-value < 0.1
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ple. In this case we must rely on th Anderson-Rubin confidence interval.
In general the estimated coefficients are positive meaning that increases in
life expectancy led to more stricter regulation. However, they are not sta-
tistically different from zero at any acceptable degree of confidence. The
only positive finding pertains to the panel estimated controlling for the lag
of regulation. This dynamic panel is intuitive since regulation is likely to
feature a important degree of persistence. The finding suggests that 10%
increase in life expectancy would lead to an increase of 2 points in the labor
regulation index 30 years later. This effect is considerably strong given that
the index ranges from 0 to 10. In general, the econometric evidence is weak,
but together with the theory presented and the cross-country evidence, it is
feasible to believe that a share of the lack in convergence observed in 20th is
due to the effects of life expectancy on labor regulation.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I provide evidence that improvements in life expectancy
achieved along the 20th century impeded countries from moving toward more
market-oriented labor regulations. First, using declines in predicted mor-
tality from medical advances in the 1940s and 1950s as an instrument for
improvements in life expectancy, the chapter shows that improvements in
health cause an decrease in the share of the skilled labor force. These low-
skilled workers increase the political support for labor regulation since they
can bargain for higher wages when the cost of worker replacement is higher.
Cross-country data shows that countries with a larger share of low-skilled
workers failed to make their labor regulation more flexible. Lastly, I show
that health improvements in the 1940s and 1950s have a positive long-run
effect on the index of labor regulation.
This result contributes to understanding why the literature fails to find
positive effects of increases in early life expectancy on income per capita.
Although, improvements in health may lead to larger investment in physical
and human capital (which would raise worker productivity), as predicted by
theory, it also prompts an increase in net fertility of low educated parents
relative to highly educated parents. In a few decades, this translates into
higher shares of unskilled workers, who lobby in favor of more strict labor
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regulation, creating barriers to economic development.
This research leads to at least two interesting questions. First, are these
differences in labor regulation persistent? If stricter labor regulation reduces
the skill-premium, the return from education declines along with the accumu-
lation of human capital. Therefore, the adoption of skill-biased technology
needs to be fast enough to guarantee the growth of the skill-premium. Sec-
ond, can countries develop in a regime of low mortality of the young with
large shares of unskilled individuals? Developed countries went through the
process of development in a regime of high infant and child mortality where
high-skilled types where favored in terms of survival rates. When the health
improvements take place the share of high-skill may be sufficiently large to
avoid the rise of barriers to development.
Finally this research warns about unintended consequences of health im-
provements. The mechanism requires that: (1) higher early life expectancy
increases the net fertility of unskilled individuals, (2) there is no social mo-
bility such that there is an unbalanced evolution of types, and (3) workers
have some political power to lobby for stricter regulation. While family
planning policies could break the first connection, if fertility is a choice as in
the models discussed in this chapter, family planning is ineffective. Nothing
should be done to break down the third connection. Therefore, policymakers
should focus on increases in social mobility through, for example, the supply




DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN BRAZILIAN
REGIONS
∗
A well-documented feature of the development process is the demographic
transition whereby an economy’s population growth rate first increases and
then decreases due to a lag between the fall in its mortality rate and the fall
in its fertility rate. Accompanying this transition is an important change in
the age structure of the population whereby the percentage of working age
citizens increases. This increase in the share of the working age population
is referred to the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend” as it has
the potential to raise per capita income simply through an accounting effect
associated with having more workers to non-workers in the population, and
not because of any direct effect on the productivity of factors.
Several researchers argue, however, that the demographic dividend may
extend beyond this pure accounting or translation effect, a so-called second
demographic dividend. It is easy to think of several channels whereby de-
mographic variables may have growth effects beyond the translation effect.1
For example, life cycle considerations suggest that an increase in the share of
the working age population will lead to an increase in an economy’s savings
rates associated with physical capital and human capital accumulation.
Early empirical work in this area examined the importance of demographic
variables for the growth of nations without attempting to determine if the
demographic dividend extended beyond the accounting effect.2 For example,
Bloom and Williamson (1998) looking at the experiences of the East Asian
tigers, found that nearly one third of the growth in per capita income is
attributed to increases in the share of the working age population. Kelley
∗Jointly with Stephen Parente and Eduardo Rios-Neto
1Lee and Mason (2006) call a second demographic dividend the growth induced by the
accumulation of factors of production resulting from the changing in age structure. It is
usually related to supply-side effects. Kuhn and Prettner (2018) investigate demand-side
explanations for the second demographic dividend.
2See Williamson (2013) for a recent literature review.
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and Schmidt (2005) extended the analysis to Asia as a whole and reached a
similar conclusion.
A second generation of works, however, does try to determine if the de-
mographic dividend extends beyond a pure accounting effect. For example,
Cuaresma et al. (2014), using a panel of countries conclude that there is a
secondary dividend associated with education. They arrive at this conclu-
sion in three steps. First, they derive a growth rate regression equation from
economic theory. Next, they show that the size of the estimated coefficients
on the demographic variables in the regression that fails to include lagged
education as a control imply an effect larger than the pure translation one.
Lastly, they show that this extra effect vanishes once lagged education is
added as a control variable. Renter´ıa et al. (2016) arrive at the same conclu-
sion for Mexico and Spain but use a different method, the National Transfer
Account (NTA) method.3
In this paper, we reexamine the question of whether the demographic divi-
dend extends beyond a pure accounting or translation effect by studying the
development experiences of Brazilian micro-regions between 1970 and 2000.
Following Cuaresma et al. (2014), we estimate a growth rate equation using
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), but extend the analysis in two
important ways. First, we break down population growth into its natural
rate of increase (NRI) component and its net migration component. Second,
we decompose the natural rate of increase into a crude birth rate component
and a crude death rate component.
There are important reasons to consider these decompositions in trying to
understand the effect of demographic variables for development. Although
both NRI and net migration have the same effect on population growth, they
may have very different impacts on a region’s growth of per capita income for
a number of reasons. For example, the effects of migration and NRI may be
different if migrants are more likely to be young and have higher fertility than
the native population. These differences in characteristics would affect the
demographics of both origin and destination economies.4 Moreover, migra-
3The National Transfer Account method calculates the economic support ratio that
weights the age structure by the labor earning and consumption age profiles. The decom-
position of the economic support ratio by education segments presents an alternative view
on the demographic dividend and its relationship with education.
4See Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2016) for a review of the effects of migration on demo-
graphic structure in an international context.
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tion may be driven by low-skilled individuals looking for better opportunities
or by the dire need to flee adverse natural conditions. Alternatively, it may
be driven by demand for high-skilled workers by firms in richer areas (brain
drain). Depending on the balance of these forces, migration may have also a
significant effect on the quality of labor force. Although the literature on the
effect of demographic dividend seems to neglect these effects – maybe due
to the smaller magnitude of migration compared with NRI in cross-country
data –, we believe this extension is important especially in a context of re-
gional economies where migration accounts for a higher share of population
growth.
Similarly, by breaking down the natural rate into a crude birth rate com-
ponent and a crude death rate component we can determine if they have
differential impacts on economic variables. Given the quality versus quantity
trade off, it is natural to think that the crude birth rate may have a greater
effect beyond the pure translation effect. Moreover, although the mechanical
effect of the crude death rate should be opposite in sign to that of the crude
birth rate, improvements in health have the potential to increase economic
growth.5 Therefore, each of these components of the NRI can possibly induce
growth effects beyond the translation effect of different magnitudes.
We find evidence of both a first demographic dividend and a second demo-
graphic dividend, with the latter being associated with education. Quantita-
tively, the effect of the first dividend is small; in a counterfactual experiment
based on our estimation results, we show that the translation effect accounts
for no more than 10 percent of the income gap between the richest and poorest
regions in Brazil. The second dividend, namely, the changes in age structure
that are correlated with the accumulation of human capital, is crucial for ex-
plaining the disparities in regional development in Brazil. Furthermore, we
show that the negative effect of population growth – and more importantly,
fertility – disappears after controlling for education, suggesting important
behavioral changes accompanying the demographic transition. In particular,
it suggests that the long-run Beckerian trade-off between child quantity (fer-
tility) and child quality (education) is at the heart of some portion of the
second demographic dividend in its fertility decline component.6
5Bloom et al. (2000), for example, suggest that increases in life expectancy were con-
ducive for growth in East Asian countries.
6The other component of the second demographic dividend is associated with increasing
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There are a number of virtues to reexamining the question of whether
the demographic dividend extends beyond a pure accounting effect using
regional data rather than international data. First, as institutions and ex-
ogenous shocks, which are clearly important for economic growth, are more
homogeneous across regions within a country than across countries, omission
of variables related biases are less likely. Second, there is far more consis-
tency in the collection of data and definition of variables inside a nation so
measurement error is less of a concern.
Despite these advantages, there are very few papers that examine the im-
portance of demographic variables for economic growth using subnational
data and that take an econometric approach. Indeed, a contribution of this
paper is to fill a gap in the regional development literature that has for the
most part neglected the potential importance of the demographic transition
for economic growth. One exception is Wei and Hao (2010) who show that
fertility has a positive effect on economic growth in Chinese provinces.7 Our
paper is also innovative in that it is the first to take an econometric approach
to test for the presence of demographic dividends in Latin American coun-
tries. There are other papers that do test for the the demographic dividend(s)
in Latin American countries, but they use the NTA method.
Of course, at the subnational level, there is the issue of whether there is
sufficient heterogeneity across regional regional units. Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 speak
to this point. Fig. 3.1 shows the national statistics for a number of relevant
demographic variables whereas Fig. 3.2 shows a subset of these statistics for
Brazil’s five macro regions. Starting with the national statistics shown in
Fig. 3.1, Brazil experienced a demographic transition in the post-World War
II period typical of middle-income developing countries. It is now at the latter
stages of this transition. As measured on the right-hand axis, population
growth rates have declined and are now converging to replacement rates. The
demographic dividend, measured by the share of the working-age population
in the total population and measured on the left-hand vertical axis, has risen
steadily since 1965 and is expected to peak at around 70% sometime between
2020 and 2025. Turning to Brazil’s five macro regions shown in Fig. 3.2, we
savings due to a decline in adult mortality. This does not seem to be relevant for the paper
here.
7Potter et al. (2002) use Brazilian microregions to show the impacts of economic de-
velopment on fertility trends. We test this relationship in the opposite direction. Barros
et al. (2015) find that change in age structure in Brazil alleviated poverty.
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Figure 3.1: Brazilian demographic transition
Note: Data from United Nations – Population division.
see large differences in the timing of the demographic transition. Although
all regions are characterized by declining population growth rates (Panel a),
these rates were lower in the Northeast, Southeast and South than in the
North and Central-West. Turning to Panel b that shows the working age
share of the population, the Southeast, South and Central-West display a
steady increase in this share since the 1970s. In contrast, the North and
Northeast, which start with lower shares, show a less steady increase with
an acceleration beginning around 1980. As we shall subsequently document,
these differences are more striking at the micro-region level, making Brazil
an excellent laboratory for testing the demographic dividend hypothesis.
This paper is divided into five sections. Following this introduction, Sec-
tion 2 briefly describes the theoretical model that underlies the regression
analysis as well as the derivation of the key regression equations. Section 3
describes the data sources and definitions of micro-regions, and then presents
summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. Section
4 describes the empirical strategy and reports the results of the regression
analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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Figure 3.2: Working age population and urbanization rate for Brazilian
regions
Note: Data from Brazilian Censuses.
3.1 A Model of Convergence
The theoretical structure that underlies the empirical analysis is the same
one utilized by most of the literature on the economics effects of demographic
change. It effectively uses the model of Hall and Jones (1999) to derive a
regression equation that gives a region’s growth rate of per capita GDP as
a function of demographic and economic variables. The model is not truly
endogenous or exogenous. 8 For the sake of exposition, we briefly describe
the derivation of this main regression equation.
Most growth models, whether they be endogenous or exogenous in nature,
make no distinction between the labor force and the population. Hence, some
modifications are needed to allow for the age structure of the population to
affect income per capita. To understand this, begin with an aggregate pro-




it , where Yit is GDP, Ait is
Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Kit is the aggregate physical capital stock,
and Hit is efficiency units of labor, which is equal to the labor force, Lit,
8Mankiw et al. (1992) being an extension of the Solow-Swan model is an exogenous
growth model. It differs importantly from the Hall and Jones (1999) specification in that
the coefficients on physical capital and human capital in the production function sum to
a number less than one.
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multiplied by the human capital of a labor force participant, hit. Unemploy-
ment issues are ignored so the labor force is assumed to be the appropriate
measure of the raw labor input. Human capital is assumed to be given by
the following equation hit = exp {θsit}, where θ is the return to schooling
and sit, is the years of schooling.
The first step in deriving the regression equation is to divide total output





it . To derive the per capita variables, one next multiplies per worker
output by the ratio of the population to the labor force, Nit/Lit. Letting yit











here, one takes the logs of both sides and differentiates to derive the growth















where x˙/x ≡ ∆ lnx denotes the growth rate of a variable x. This is the
equation used by Cuaresma et al. (2014) in their studies on the demographic
dividend.9
As a matter of principle, a truly endogenous growth model would not
consider continuous changes in TFP. However, as a practical matter, it is
considered so as to allow for the possibility of catch-up along the lines of
Barro (1991). Catch-up depends on how far a region is from the technological
frontier with the idea being that regions closer to the frontier find it more
difficult to increase their TFPs. The standard approach is to proxy for a
region’s distance from the technological frontier by its lagged per worker GDP
in the TFP growth rate equation. However, for the purpose of considering
the effects of demographic variables, per worker GDP is converted to a per
capita equivalent in the TFP growth rate equation. Additionally, following
Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) who argue that
better educated societies are more likely to innovate, lagged years of schooling
is also added to the TFP growth equation. These considerations give rise to
the following equation for the growth rate of a region’s TFP,
A˙it
Ait
= δ + ρsit−1 + µ ln yit−1 − µ lnwait−1 − µ ln pit−1, (3.2)
9Other translations are possible. See Kelley and Schmidt (2005) for a discussion.
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where pit is the participation rate and wait is the age structure (i.e, working
age populuation). Let Wit denote the population between 15 and 64 years of
age, then pit ≡ Lit/Wit and wait ≡ Wit/Nit. To reiterate, the inclusion of the
working age share and the participation rate is a consequence of converting
per worker GDP to per capita GDP. If the demographic dividend is limited to
a pure translation effect, then the demographic variables will have no effect
on the growth rate of TFP.




= δ + ρsit−1 + µ ln yit−1 − µ lnwait−1 − µ ln pit−1+










Eq. (3.3) is the basis for three regression models used in this paper that
test the effects of demographic variables on economic growth. All three allow
for region and time fixed effects. The first regression model is










+ νi + ϕt + it,
(3.4)
where νi is a fixed effect of region and ϕt a time fixed effect. it is structural
random shock. As is standard in this literature, the dependent variable
is transformed into levels to emphasize the autoregressive structure of the
model.10 This transformation implies β1 = 1 + µ. If demographic variables
have only an accounting effect on growth, then β3 = β4 = 1 − β1 and β7 =
−β8 = 1. This model is the regression equation used by Cuaresma et al.
(2014).
Models 2 and 3 extend it. The second model decomposes population
growth as follows: N˙it/Nit = nrit + nmit, where nrit is the natural rate
of increase (NRI) and nmit is the net migration per capita.
11 The regression
10See, for example, Caselli et al. (1996) who started a tradition of GMM estimation of
growth models.
11The natural rate of increase is calculated as crude birth rates minus crude death rates,
whereas net migration per capita is the difference between population growth and natural
rate of increase. Details are provided in the next section.
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equation is then







+β8nrit + β9nmit + νi + ϕt + it.
(3.5)
If demographic variables have only an accounting effect, then β3 = β4 =
1 − β1, β7 = 1 and β8 = β9 = −1. The third regression model expresses
the NRI as the difference between the crude birth rate (CBR) and the crude
death rate (CDR). Namely, nrit = cbrit − cdrit, where cbrit is the CBR and
cdrit is the CDR. Therefore, we have our third extension:







+β8cbrit + β9cdrit + β10nmit + νi + ϕt + it.
(3.6)
Here demographic variables only have a pure accounting effect if β3 = β4 =
1− β1, β7 = β9 = 1 and β8 = β10 = −1.
With Eq. (3.4) we can check if the the results of Cuaresma et al. (2014)
hold for subnational economies with significant heterogeneity. With Eq. (3.5)
we can study the effects of net migration and with Eq. (3.6) we can study
the individual effects of fertility and mortality.
3.2 Data
Brazilian municipalities are the building blocks for the data set we construct.
By definition, municipalities are the smallest independent jurisdictions in
Brazil with elected mayors as chief executives and city council legislators as
elected representatives. There are over 5,500 municipalities in Brazil, un-
evenly distributed across states. For example, Minas Gerais has the most
with 853 municipalities whereas Roraima has the least with 15. Municipal-
ities are diverse localities with some being rich, fully urbanized areas and
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others being poor, rural areas.
Starting with these municipalities, we then aggregate the units into micro-
regions. Micro-regions are identified based on the definition of homogeneous
spaces established by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
(IBGE) that takes into account natural, social and economic characteristics.
All totaled, there are 558 micro-regions in Brazil according to this defini-
tion.12
The data relating to the demographic variables for these micro-regions are
taken from the Brazilian Census of 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2000 whereas the
data relating to economic variables are taken from IPEA with the exception
of GDP, which is taken from the regional accounts. Economic variables like
demographic ones are collected at the municipality level. GDP is the estimate
of total output at factor costs measured in 2000 prices. The labor force is
the economically active population and the working-age population is the
number of citizens between ages 15 and 64. Years of schooling is the average
years of schooling of the population above age 25.
The construction of crude birth rates relies on Census data using Brass P/F
method (United Nations, 1983). This method uses single year data about
lifetime fertility (alive children ever born) adjusted by recent fertility (alive
children born last year) in order to produce estimates of crude births.13 Crude
death rates are computed using life expectancy data for municipalities. With
the life expectancy data in hand, the Coale-Demeny West life table (United
Nations, 2012) is applied to calculate mortality rates by age group, which,
in turn, are multiplied by the population by age group to compute CDRs by
municipality. The data for life expectancy is taken from the Brazilian Atlas
of Human Development sourced from IPEA and the population by age is
sourced from the Brazilian Censuses.
Given the panel structure of the data and given that many variables in the
regression model are expressed in growth rates, we work with the following
periods: 1970-80, 1980-91, 1991-2000. Growth rates are therefore expressed
as the decade percentage change and not an average annual one. Thus, for
each micro-region there are three sets of observations in our panel, one for
12This level of regional disaggregation was used, for instance, by Dix-Carneiro (2014)
and Lima and Silveira Neto (2016).
13el-Badry correction was applied when the share of missing parities were above 2%
(el Badry, 1961).
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each of the three periods. Although the CBR and CDR are measured using a
single Census, we argue that these variables reflect individual behavior along
the previous decade, given, for example, that CBR uses lifetime fertility in
its calculation. We than transform these representative annual statistics into
decade growth rates.
There are a number of problematic issues regarding data availability. One
problem is that there are no measures of GDP available in 1991. To deal
with this problem, we construct 1991 measures by interpolating the 1985 and
1996 values assuming a constant growth rate. Another complication is that
although there is data by municipality for the residential capital stock, there
is no data on the total stock of physical capital. Faced with this dilemma,
we use residential capital as a proxy for the total physical capital stock.
Whereas this may be a source of mismeasurement, Firme and Sima˜o Filho
(2014) actually claim that this proxy delivers more consistent results.14
Another important issue in constructing these two panels is that many
municipalities were created during the 30 years of analysis. More to the
point, some municipalities were split into multiple municipalities in the pe-
riod. Thus, it is necessary to construct the data for these newly established
areas prior to their creations. Towards this goal, we work with Minimum
Comparable Areas of 1970 with the strategy of using the data for the unsplit
municipality for the earlier years.15 After making these adjustments and
dropping municipalities that are missing data for some years, we arrive at a
balanced panel for 528 micro-regions containing 1584 observations.
Fig. 3.3 depicts the geographical distribution of population among micro-
regions in 1970. It is readily apparent that most of Brazil’s population is con-
centrated in the coastal (east) area of the country. The North and Central-
West regions are characterized by large but sparsely populated micro-regions
mainly due to geographic features such as the Amazon forest and swamp-
lands. In light of this fact, we exclude these two regions from our main
sample reducing our balanced panel to 440 micro-regions.16
Table 3.1 presents the means and standard deviations of the main variables
of interest across Brazilian micro-regions with standard deviation indicated
14See Lima and Silveira Neto (2016) for detailed discussion.
15We use Minimum Comparable Areas identified by Ehrl (2017).
16Most results do not change with the full sample, however, specification tests are
weaker.
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Figure 3.3: Population by micro-regions in 1970
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in parentheses. Over the thirty-year period, average GDP per capita has in-
creased substantially, especially in the 1970s when the so called Brazilian eco-
nomic miracle occurred. During the 1980s, average GDP per capita decreased
with the debt crisis and macroeconomic instability. It recovered mildly in
the 1990s associated with greater openness and price stability. Turning to
the standard deviations, we see that income inequality between micro-regions
has been rising over time, and is positively correlated with average GDP per
capita. The average capital stock per worker variable mirrors very closely
the GDP per capita variable, especially in terms of averages. The average
per worker capital has not increased by as much however over the thirty year
period. The years of schooling variable shows a more stable increase than
the two other economic variables with no decline in the 1990s. The dispar-
ity in years of schooling across micro-regions has increased over the entire
thirty-year period, except in the 1990s.
Turning to the demographic variables, the average population growth rate
shows a steady secular decline whereas both the participation rate and the
working age population show steady secular increases. Although the stan-
dard deviation of the population growth rate declines across micro-regions,
the disparities in the participation rate and the share of the working age pop-
ulation show no clear trend. The standard deviation of the participation rates
at first decreases and then increases. For the share of the working age popu-
lation, the disparity across micro-regions first increases and then decreases.
The average NRI of micro-regions follows a pattern similar to the popula-
tion growth rate with a steady decline throughout. However, the disparity
drops in the 1970s and 1980s and remains relatively constant thereafter. The
time path of the average NRI is explained by the continuous decline in the
CBR that is larger in absolute value than the continuous decline in the aver-
age CDR. Finally, average net migration shows a continuous steady decline
contributing more to the reduction in population growth compared with the
NRI.
To provide a more comprehensive picture of the economic and demographic
trends, Fig. 3.4 plots population growth, NRI, CBR, CDR, share of working-
age population and years of schooling for micro-regions. The middle line
drawn in each plot represents the average whereas the other two lines repre-
sent the 10% and 90% percentiles. Panels (a)-(d) make it clear that Brazil
is at the final stages of its demographic transition: CBRs have declined to
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Table 3.1: Mean and standard deviation for Brazilian micro-regions
variables
1970 1980 1991 2000 Total
Per Capita GDP 3.437 6.643 6.152 7.083 6.061
(2.997) (4.699) (3.932) (4.325) (4.295)
Per Worker Capital 12.32 14.28 13.41 15.91 14.19
(8.532) (8.411) (8.165) (7.990) (8.334)
Years of Schooling 2.325 3.414 4.707 5.754 4.306
(1.311) (1.574) (1.703) (1.652) (2.032)
Population Growth – 0.242 0.196 0.135 0.152
– (0.195) (0.129) (0.0871) (0.150)
Participation Rate 0.582 0.630 0.659 0.706 0.653
(0.0537) (0.0446) (0.0432) (0.0486) (0.0646)
Working-Age Pop. 0.550 0.582 0.608 0.649 0.604
(0.0462) (0.0572) (0.0489) (0.0379) (0.0596)
Natural Rate of Increase 0.0108 0.00890 0.00696 0.00421 0.00725
(0.00653) (0.00602) (0.00397) (0.00384) (0.00556)
Net Migration – 0.126 0.102 0.0858 0.0837
– (0.214) (0.119) (0.0735) (0.134)
Crude Birth Rate 39.81 32.84 24.03 20.41 27.78
(8.666) (7.016) (5.185) (3.545) (9.457)
Crude Death Rate 28.97 23.95 17.07 16.20 20.54
(5.550) (4.604) (4.604) (3.983) (6.789)
Means weighted by population. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
such a low value relative to CDRs that population growth rates are near the
replacement rate. At the same time, this transition has been accompanied
by rising education levels (panel e), consistent with a quantity-quality ar-
gument, and by increasing shares of the working age population (panel f),
implying the potential of a larger demographic dividend.
In sum, the dynamics of the Brazilian regional economies over the last
thirty years of the 20th century are characterized by strong economic growth
followed by a drawn out recession and stabilization. They are also character-
ized by latter stages of the demographic transition. These transitions have
brought about an increases in educational levels and demographic dividends.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of demographic variables and education in Brazilian
regions
Note: Data from Brazilian Census. The middle line is the average and the lower and
upper bounds are the 10th and the 90th percentiles.
42
The process of development is not uniform across regions, however, so that
were large differences in both economic and demographic variables in this
period across micro-regions.
This brings us to the question of how much of the growth of Brazilian
regions is accounted for by changes in demographic variables and how much
is accounted for by non-demographic variables. Answering this question is
the main objective of the next section.
3.3 Effect of Demographic Dividend in Brazil
This section first explains the empirical strategy adopted in this paper and
then reports the results of that strategy applied to the regression equations
derived in Section 2. The estimation of all three models is challenging given
that all regressors are potentially endogenous and given that the lagged de-
pendent variable is correlated with the fixed effect term (Nickell, 1981). One
way to mitigate these potential biases is to take differences so that the re-
gression equation becomes




′βe + ∆ϕt + ∆it, (3.7)
where Xp is the vector of predetermined variables, namely,
Xpit−1 = [ln yit−1, sit−1, lnwait−1, ln pit−1]
′,
with βp its associated coefficients vector and where analogously, Xe is the
vector of endogenous variables, namely,
Xeit =

[ ˙¯kit/k¯it,∆sit, L˙it/Lit, N˙it/Nit]
′ if Eq. (3.4)
[ ˙¯kit/k¯it,∆sit, L˙it/Lit, nrit, nmit]
′ if Eq. (3.5)
[ ˙¯kit/k¯it,∆sit, L˙it/Lit, cbrit, cdrit, nmit]
′ if Eq. (3.6).
with βe its associated coefficients vector. The moment conditions
E[Xpit−s∆it] = 0 t ≥ 3, s ≥ 2,
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and
E[Xeit−s∆it] = 0 t ≥ 3, s ≥ 2,
can then be used to instrument Xp and Xe. First and earlier lags of pre-
determined variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the difference of
the error. Second and earlier lags of endogenous variables are assumed to be
uncorrelated with the difference of the error.
This estimation strategy was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and
is usually called Difference GMM (Diff-GMM, hereafter). Bond et al. (2001)
point out that the Diff-GMM has poor finite sample properties when β1, i.e.,
the coefficient on the log of lagged GDP per capita in the regression model,
is close to one or when the variance of the fixed effect increases relative to
the variance of . In these situations, they advocate the use of the system
GMM (Sys-GMM), developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This method
builds a system of two equations, the original and Eq. (3.7), and explores
extra moment conditions to instrument the lagged dependent variable and
other endogenous variables. Namely,
E[it∆X
e




it] = 0 t ≥ 2.
The extra moment conditions required by the Sys-GMM are often consid-
ered invalid for growth regressions. This is because the Sys-GMM assumes
the initial value of predetermined variables do not correlate with the fixed
effects. However, Bond et al. (2001) argues that this assumption is valid
when dealing with long-run growth provided one controls for time fixed ef-
fects (in the sense that the variables are deviation from the time mean). For
our purpose, this would entail assuming that all micro-regions are in their
steady states. Hauk and Wacziarg (2009), however, have a different take on
this issue. They point out that a growth variable may represent the long-
run growth or a transitional period. Nevertheless, the authors claim that
Sys-GMM may still be a good estimator in practice for short panels.
In sum, neither the Diff-GMM and Sys-GMM is ideal for our purpose.
The former performs poorly in short panels (which is our case), whereas the
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latter has questionable extra moment conditions.17 We proceed to report
the results from a two-step Sys-GMM correcting for arbitrary heteroscedas-
ticity and arbitrary within meso-regions correlations in the main text of the
paper.18 We leave to an appendix the results pertaining to the Diff-GMM
and other estimation procedures. The two step Sys-GMM is our preferred
estimation based on the relevance of the instruments. The relevance of the
instruments are based on three statistics: the Hansen-J , Kleibergen-Paap
LM and Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F. The first tests the validity of overiden-
tification instruments, the second tests for underindentification and the third
indicates the strength of the instruments.19
The regression results that constitute a check for the Cuaresma et al. (2014)
findings, namely, Eq. (3.4), are presented in Table 3.2. Following Cuaresma
et al. (2014), the model is estimated three times, corresponding to the three
columns in the Table. The first column omits the schooling variables as
controls. The second adds the change in schooling over the period as a control
whereas the third adds the lagged level of schooling as a control. Recall that
Cuaresma et al. (2014) arrive at the conclusion that there is a secondary
demographic dividend associated with education by first showing that the
coefficients on the demographic variables in an estimation that does not
control for education imply an effect larger than a pure translation one. This
is the point of Column 1. Then they show that this extra effect disappears
from the equation once the level and change of education is accounted for.
This is the point of Columns 2 and 3.20
For each regression column, we report the p-values of the Hansen-J test for
the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. We also report the p-values for
the null hypothesis tests regarding evidence of a pure accounting (translation)
effect associated with the demographic change. Recall from Eq. (3.4) that
17From a practical point of view, Cuaresma et al. (2014) uses the Sys-GMM in a similar
application. However, other empirical growth papers, such as Acemoglu et al. (2008) and
Cervellati et al. (2014) refrain from using it, employing the Diff-GMM instead.
18Meso-region is a regional division in Brazil defined by the IBGE. They are larger
than micro-regions but smaller than states. We cluster errors by meso-regions in order to
capture common regional shocks among micro-regions.
19Although Kleibergen-Paap statistics are not designed for GMM methods, we follow
the suggestion of Bazzi and Clemens (2013) and use these statistics as a check for the
validity of our instruments. Refer to this paper and references therein for discussion and
explanation about these tests.
20The results of the regression pertaining to the lagged GDP per capita and growth of
capital per worker variables are omitted to save space.
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Table 3.2: Demographic dividend for Brazilian regions: Eq. (3.4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln pit−1 0.37 0.73 0.82∗∗ 0.89 0.80∗∗ 0.62
(0.30) (0.69) (0.28) (0.51) (0.28) (0.45)
lnwait−1 0.57∗ 2.06∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗
(0.29) (0.64) (0.26) (0.41) (0.30) (0.45)
∆ lnLit 0.65
∗∗ 2.07∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.12 0.64∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.22) (0.73) (0.19) (0.55) (0.19) (0.54)
∆ lnNit -0.32 -1.69
∗ -0.37 -0.25 -0.38 -0.45
(0.25) (0.73) (0.22) (0.35) (0.22) (0.38)
∆sit 0.30
∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.13) (0.06) (0.12)
sit−1 0.02 0.08
(0.06) (0.05)
Observations 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Micro-Regions 440 440 440 440 440 440
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.00 0.22 0.42
Growth (p-value) 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.28
Level (p-value) 0.07 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.66 0.17
All (p-value) 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.12
Robust standard errors clustered by meso-regions in parentheses. Coefficients are estimated using
a two-step efficient Sys-GMM correcting for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within meso-
regions correlation. ln yit−1 and ˙¯kit/k¯it are omitted to save space. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001
the coefficients on the growth of the labor force rate and the growth of the
population must be 1 and −1, respectively, and the coefficients on the lag of
the participation rate and the share of the working-age population must be
equal to 1 minus the coefficient on the lagged GDP per capita control if the
demographic dividend only has a pure accounting effect. In Table 3.2 the row
labeled “Growth p-value” is the p-value from the test in which −β7 = β8 = 1
in Eq. (3.4); the row labeled “Level p-value” is the p-value from the test that
β3 = β4 = 1 − β1; and the row labeled “All p-value” is the p-value test in
which the null hypothesis is the previous equalities for all coefficients jointly.
Column (1) in Table 3.2 shows that demographic variables have an impor-
tant role in explaining economic growth when educational variables are not
accounted for. Faster population growth negatively impacts growth of GDP
per capita whereas a larger share of the working-age population and faster
growth of the labor force positively impact it. All three effects are significant
at the 5% level. Turning to the tests for an accounting effect, although we
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cannot conclude that the growth related demographic variables, i.e., ∆ lnLit
and ∆ lnNit, have productivity effects, we can conclude that the level related
demographic variables, i.e., ln pit−1 and lnwait−1, do.
It is important to note that the p-value for the Hansen-J test is very low
suggesting that the moment conditions used in this estimation are not valid.
Therefore, one must be very careful in interpreting the coefficients reported
in this column and drawing any conclusions. The Hansen-J test result is not
at all surprising, however. Recall that, when not included as a regressor, the
effect of education is partially captured in the error term. As theory predicts
an active relationship between education and demographic variables, one
would expect invalid instruments since the lagged demographic variables are
used as instruments.21 In fact, when we include education in the model
(Column 2), the Hansen-J test do not reject that the moment conditions
are valid. In this case, only the working age share of the population is
significant at the 5% level. However, we reject the null that level demographic
variables have only accounting effects, and all demographic variables have
only accounting effects jointly. This conclusion no longer holds when we
add lagged education in Column (3): even though the lagged share of the
working-age population still positively affects economic growth, we cannot
reject the null that both level and growth demographic variables have only
accounting effects.
Table 3.2 clearly shows that the accumulation of human capital via school-
ing is important for understanding regional growth performances. This is
consistent with the findings of Acemoglu and Dell (2010) and Gennaioli et al.
(2014) that point to human capital differences as the fundamental determi-
nant of differences in regional development.22 The inclusion of education in
the regressions reduces the importance of demographic variables to the point
that there is only a translation effect. Moreover, the instruments are valid
after education is included suggesting a correlation between demographic and
education. In this sense, the demographic dividend extends beyond a pure
21This is not the only possible reason to reject the null in the Hansen-J test. As
emphasized by Davidson and MacKinnon (2004, p. 368), “a [Hansen-J ] test may reject
the null hypothesis for more than one reason. Perhaps the model is misspecified. [...]
Perhaps, one or more of the instruments is invalid because it is correlated with the error
term.”
22Silveira-Neto and Azzoni (2006) and Lima and Silveira Neto (2016) highlight the
importance of human capital accumulation for the development of Brazilian regions.
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translation effect. This echos the findings of Cuaresma et al. (2014). Why the
demographic dividend is related to human capital growth is another matter.
One possibility is the quantity-quality trade-off where fertility declines are
related to improvements in the quality of offspring. Another is the quality of
migrants that either move in or move out of the region. We investigate these
possibility in the next table.
Turning to Table 3.3, Columns (1)-(3) pertain to Eq. (3.5), whereas Columns
(4)-(6) to Eq. (3.6). The three columns associated with each model repeat
the analysis of Table 3.2. Starting with Column (1) we see that the nega-
tive effect of population growth found in Table 3.2 is mainly driven by the
NRI. Net migration has a statistically insignificant effect on growth of per
capita GDP. The effect of the lagged share of the working-age population is
positive and significant at the 5% level. Importantly, we can reject the nulls
that demographic variables only have accounting effects. When the accu-
mulation of human capital is added (Column 2), none of the three growth
related demographic variables are statistically significant while the effect of
the lagged share of the working-age population becomes larger (with an in-
crease in statistical significance as well). Additionally, we can now reject the
null hypothesis that the level demographic variables only have accounting
effects, although we cannot reject the null pertaining to the growth demo-
graphic variables or all demographic variables. Once we introduce lagged
education as a control in Column (3), the lagged share of the working age
population loses some of its explanatory power. This mirrors the finding
in Table 3.2. Importantly, we cannot reject the null that all demographic
variables have only accounting effects.23
Turning to our third model which decomposes the NRI into its CBR and
CDR components, Column (4) indicates that only the CBR and CDR vari-
ables are statistically significant; the age structure and the change in the
labor force each loses its significance once the NRI is broken down into its
two components. This is most likely on account that fertility is a direct de-
terminant of age structure. Interestingly, the CDR affects growth negatively.
This is inconsistent with the translation effect, which suggests the opposite
23We refrain from rejecting the null hypothesis that All demographic variables have
only accounting effects when the p-values is 0.05 for three reasons. (1) level and growth
tests point to not reject this hypothesis for the groups of variables; (2) it makes the results
consistent with Table 3.2; (3) the p-value is sensitive to the model specification as discussed
in the appendix. Therefore, we do not believe there is enough evidence to reject the null.
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Table 3.3: Demographic dividend for Brazilian regions: Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln pit−1 0.42 0.51 0.84∗∗ 0.95 0.82∗∗ 0.76
(0.31) (0.60) (0.28) (0.48) (0.29) (0.45)
lnwait−1 0.62∗ 1.64∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗
(0.29) (0.70) (0.26) (0.51) (0.30) (0.50)
∆ lnLit 0.60
∗∗ 1.48∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.22 0.60∗∗ 0.14
(0.21) (0.75) (0.18) (0.57) (0.18) (0.49)
nmit -0.26 -1.01 -0.33 -0.17 -0.33 -0.26
(0.24) (0.65) (0.20) (0.35) (0.21) (0.35)
nrit -0.65 -1.86
∗∗ -0.58 -0.04 -0.62 -0.13
(0.35) (0.59) (0.33) (0.52) (0.34) (0.46)
∆sit 0.29
∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.16) (0.06) (0.14)
sit−1 0.04 0.03
(0.06) (0.05)
Observations 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Micro-Regions 440 440 440 440 440 440
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.00 0.12 0.18
Growth (p-value) 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.13
Level (p-value) 0.11 0.10 0.60 0.00 0.73 0.07
All (p-value) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Robust standard errors clustered by meso-regions in parentheses. Coefficients are estimated using a
two-step efficient Sys-GMM correcting for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within meso-regions
correlation. ln yit−1 and ˙¯kit/k¯it are omitted to save space. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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effect as an increase in the CDR leads to a decline in population growth.
The null that the growth demographic variables only have accounting effects
is easily rejected. These findings change with the introduction of the accu-
mulation of human capital variable in Column (5). In particular, the lagged
share of working-age population now becomes statistically significant at the
5% level while the CBR and CDR lose their significance. Still, we are un-
able to reject the null that level demographic variables only have accounting
effects. Adding lagged education (Column (6)) weakens the effects of the de-
mographic variables, especially the lagged share of working-age population.
Importantly, we cannot reject the null that demographic change had only
accounting affects on the development process of Brazilian regions.
The conclusion that follows from these exercises is that changes in the
age structure that accompany the demographic transition do not explain the
economic performance of Brazilian regions beyond a pure accounting effect.
Nonetheless, this change is likely to be correlated with the accumulation of
human capital, which turns out to be crucial for explaining the disparities in
regional development. In this sense, there is a second demographic dividend.
The negative effect of population growth – and more importantly, fertility –
disappears after controlling for education. This suggests that the gains from
declining fertility are associated with more educated offspring, which is in line
with the quantity vs quality theory of fertility (Becker and Lewis, 1973). It is
also possible that human capital accumulation is causing fertility to decline,
since more educated parents have higher opportunity costs of rearing children
(Becker, 1981). Net migration, whether we do or do not control for education,
has the same effect suggesting that there is only a pure translation effect, or
something more complicated whereby there are offsetting effects.24
Regardless of the direction of causation, the results strongly suggest that
education is a fundamental growth-inducing component of the demographic
transition. The estimations that make use of the CDR and CBR data sug-
gest important behavioral changes accompanying the demographic transition.
The estimations in their entirety provide strong evidence of a second demo-
graphic dividend that exists in the form of education. These findings are
certainly in line with a number of unified theories of growth such as Galor
and Weil (2000) where the slowdown of population growth is accompanied by
24On the positive side, there is brain drain. On the negative there are migrants who are
forced to leave their homes due to natural disasters such as drought.
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investment in education, which, in turn, implies growth of income per capita.
Interestingly, we do not find evidence of the Nelson-Phelps theory that a re-
gion’s TFP growth depends on its human capital, although the introduction
of lagged education strengthens the effects of human capital accumulation
on growth of per capita GDP.25
To provide some perspective of the importance of demographic changes for
economic performance we end this section with a simple exercise that is based
on the regression results. In particular, we wish to determine how important
the translation effect alone is for understanding regional performances. Ef-
fectively, this ignores the variations in human capital accumulation that is
associated with demographic variables. For this purpose, we focus on the
poorest and richest macro-regions in Brazil, the Northeast and Southeast,
respectively, which are clearly at very different stages of demographic tran-
sition particularly in terms of their shares of the working-age population.
Whereas in the Northeast only 55% of population were of working age in
1991, this number was 64% in the Southeast. Let us suppose that demo-
graphic variables only have accounting effects so that the difference in the
growth of labor force and growth of the population, L˙/L− N˙/N , affects the
growth of GDP per capita one for one. Keeping labor productivity, physical
capital and human capital accumulation constant across the two regions, how
much of the gap in per capita GDP would be eliminated if the Northeast had
had the same pattern of L˙/L − N˙/N as Southeast? The per capita GDP
gaps between 1980 and 2000 predicted by the counterfactual are plotted in
Fig. 3.5. For comparison, the actual gaps are plotted. One can see that the
gap would decrease from 3.5 to 3.2 in 1980, a roughly 9% decline. In 2000, the
reduction in the gap would be roughly 5%. These are small reductions. We
conclude from this that the pure accounting effect of the demographic divi-
dend is of small consequence in accounting for differences in regional living
standards. To the extent that demographic variables contribute significantly
to regional disparities, it must be through human capital accumulation.
25Lagged education may be insignificant in explaining growth in the case of Brazil regions
as TFP growth explains only one fifth of GDP growth (Pinheiro, 1990; Abreu Pessoa et al.,
2008). This is in contrast to cross-country studies where TFP growth accounts for nearly
half of GDP growth.
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Figure 3.5: Counterfactual the gap of GDP per capita between Southeast
and Northeast regions
3.4 Conclusion
Exploiting heterogeneity across Brazilian micro-regions over the 1970-2000
period, this paper has attempted to determine if there is a demographic
dividend that extends beyond a pure accounting effect. Using a Sys-GMM
approach, it finds evidence of a pure accounting effect, but only after con-
trolling for human capital Therefore, in the case of Brazilian micro-regions,
there is a second demographic dividend, which is associated with education.
This second dividend is the far more important of the two dividends in terms
of growth. Indeed, in a counterfactual exercise, we show that the accounting
effect is responsible for less that 10% of the income gap between the poorest
and richest regions in Brazil. Our findings echo those of Cuaresma et al.
(2014).
To the extent that demographic variables matter for economic growth,
it is through their effect on human capital accumulation. This is what the
estimations reveal. Demographic variables, both in growth rates and in levels,
affect economic growth beyond a pure translation effect only when education
is not accounted for. This effect is probably due to bias from the omission
of education as a regressor.
We emphasize that we are not claiming that demographic variables cause
human capital accumulation. This is not something that we address in these
tests. It may be that the causation is from education to demographic vari-
ables. All we can conclude from these exercises is that education is a funda-
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mental growth-inducing component of the demographic transition.
In addition to testing for causation, there are a number of future areas of
research to pursue in light of the paper’s findings. One possible extension
is to consider refinements in our measures of changes in the labor force and
share of the working age population, such as female labor force participation.
As an increase in the labor force participation rate may have a different effect
depending on whether it is driven more by women or men.
3.5 Robustness
In this appendix, we discuss the sensitivity of the results reported in the
main body of the paper. It is informative to see if our results change if an
alternative estimation strategy is used. Tables 3.4 to 3.6 report results from
a variety of different estimation methods for the regressions that control for
lagged schooling and human capital accumulation. Namely, we report the
counterpart to the results pertaining to Column (3) of Tables 3.2 and 3.3,
and Column (6) in Table 3.3. Column (1) presents a pooled OLS whereas
Column (2) presents a within-groups OLS (Fixed Effects). In Columns (3)
and (4) we present results for the two-step efficient Diff-GMM correcting for
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within meso-regions correlation.
Column (4) differs from Column (3) in that it collapses the instrument set.
The remaining columns use the two-step efficient Sys-GMM. Columns (5)
uses the baseline specification whereas Column (6) collapses the instruments.
Column (7) treats lagged variables as endogenous and Column (8) considers
only the first lag of lagged variables as instruments. Information in the tables
include the translation tests, the estimation method, how lagged variables are
treated, the number of instruments, whether the instruments are collapsed
or not, the p-value of Hansen-J test of validity of instruments, the p-value of
Kleibergen-Paap LM test of underidentification and the Kleibergen-Paap rk
F statistic.26
The reason for estimating the equation using pooled OLS and within-group
OLS is motivated by Bond et al. (2001), who noted that the coefficient for
the lagged dependent variable is upward biased in the pooled OLS estimation
26Kleibergen-Paap statistics are obtained from two-step least squares IV estimation
method using lagged variables in a GMM style. See Bazzi and Clemens (2013) for details.
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and downward biased in the within-groups OLS estimation. Thus, if the
Difference GMM or System GMM coefficient is close or below the within-
groups estimate, then the bias caused by the persistence of the times series
may be important.
Looking at Table 3.4, we find that for both the Sys-GMM and Diff-GMM,
the coefficient of lagged GDP per capita is between the within-groups and the
OLS estimates, and all of them, except in Column (7), are significant. Re-
garding the quality of our instruments, the Diff-GMMs present low p-values
for both the Hansen-J test and the Kleibergen-Paap LM test suggesting that
moment conditions are not valid and that only lagged instruments underi-
dentify the endogenous variables. Also, the Kleibergen-Paap rk F statistic is
below unit suggesting weak instruments. For the Sys-GMM, Hansen-J tests
do not reject the null of valid moments condition at the level of 18% (at least)
and, excluding the case where lagged variables are treated as endogenous, the
Kleibergen-Paap LM test rejects the null hypothesis of underidentification.
Columns (5), (6) and (8) present similar Kleibergen-Paap rk F statistic, al-
though none is above the usual rule of thumb of 5. All three columns have
same qualitative and very similar quantitative results with the exception that
the lagged share of working-age population is not statistically significant at
the 5% level when only the first lag of lagged variables are used as instru-
ments. We conclude that the result present in Column (3) of Table 3.2 is
robust to different specifications that satisfies the specification tests.
Most the analysis of Table 3.4 is repeated in Table 3.5, where the results
of Eq. (3.5) are presented. The main difference is that even for the Sys-
GMM p-values for Hansen-J tests are lower. However, we fail to reject the
moment condition are valid at the 18% level for Column (5) and at the
13% level for Column (8). Again the main specifications – the ones with
higher Kleibergen-Paap rk F statistics – present similar quantitative results
confirming the robustness of the results presented in Column (3) of Table 3.3.
The analysis for Table 3.6, where the robustness of Column (6) in Table 3.3
is presented, mirrors the ones for previous tables. Columns (5), (6) and (8)
present Kleibergen-Paap rk F statistics above 5 and the Hansen-J tests do
not reject the null of valid instrument at least at the level of 16%. Again the
results in these columns are similar and we conclude the results presented in
Section 4 are robust.
54
Table 3.4: Robustness: Column (3) Table 3.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln yit−1 0.69∗∗∗ -0.00 0.55∗ 0.66∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.21 0.53∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.25) (0.33) (0.08) (0.09) (0.19) (0.08)
ln pit−1 0.27∗ 0.80∗∗ 2.35 2.51 0.62 0.63 2.45 0.39
(0.12) (0.28) (1.52) (1.68) (0.45) (0.56) (2.31) (0.57)
lnwait−1 0.69∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 2.90 3.00 1.33∗∗ 1.28∗ 3.41∗ 1.00
(0.23) (0.30) (2.21) (3.10) (0.45) (0.55) (1.55) (0.53)
sit−1 0.07∗∗ 0.02 -0.13 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.10
(0.02) (0.06) (0.43) (0.62) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.06)
∆ ln kit 0.23
∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.14 -0.58 0.07 0.03 -0.64 0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.52) (0.63) (0.20) (0.26) (0.77) (0.21)
∆ lnLit 0.67
∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 1.46 1.75 0.15 0.20 1.73 -0.10
(0.11) (0.19) (1.51) (1.76) (0.54) (0.64) (1.71) (0.67)
∆ lnNit -0.62
∗∗∗ -0.38 -1.98 -2.21 -0.45 -0.44 -1.10 -0.34
(0.12) (0.22) (1.31) (1.43) (0.38) (0.46) (0.80) (0.43)
∆sit 0.35
∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.54 0.76 0.69∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.45) (0.75) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14)
Observations 1320 1320 880 880 1320 1320 1320 1320
Microregions 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Growth (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.42 0.28 0.44 0.81 0.26
Level (p-value) 0.25 0.66 0.39 0.31 0.17 0.34 0.08 0.54
All (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.29 0.09 0.22
Method OLS WG Diff. Diff. Sys. Sys. Sys. Sys.
Lagged Var. Pred. Pred. Pred. Pred. End. Lag 1
Instruments 14 12 27 23 19 25
Collapsed No Yes No Yes No No
Hansen-J p-value 0.01 . 0.42 0.18 0.24 0.36
Kleibergen-Paap LM 0.36 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00
Kleibergen-Paap rk F 0.68 0.65 4.12 4.38 0.64 4.38
Robust standard errors clustered by meso-regions in parentheses. Method indi-
cates which method is used: OLS, fixed effects (WG), Diff-GMM (Diff.), Sys-GMM
(Sys.). Lagged Var. indicates if lagged variables are treated as predetermined
(Pred.), endogenous (End.) or if only one lag is considered (Lag 1). Instruments
indicates the number of instruments and Collapsed whether they are collapsed or
not. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
55
Table 3.5: Robustness: Column (3) Table 3.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln yit−1 0.69∗∗∗ -0.01 0.52 0.53 0.59∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.20 0.58∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.33) (0.41) (0.08) (0.09) (0.19) (0.09)
ln pit−1 0.22 0.82∗∗ 1.41 3.15 0.76 0.87 2.45 0.65
(0.11) (0.29) (1.74) (2.08) (0.45) (0.63) (1.97) (0.48)
lnwait−1 0.93∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.05 4.22 1.53∗∗ 1.42∗∗ 3.79∗ 1.25∗
(0.23) (0.30) (3.25) (4.21) (0.50) (0.52) (1.48) (0.56)
sit−1 0.06∗∗ 0.04 0.08 -0.33 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05
(0.02) (0.06) (0.83) (0.94) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06)
∆ ln kit 0.23
∗∗∗ 0.05 0.31 -0.72 0.02 0.01 -0.53 0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.61) (0.79) (0.22) (0.26) (0.66) (0.23)
∆ lnLit 0.72
∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.78 2.53 0.14 0.54 1.84 0.10
(0.11) (0.18) (1.56) (2.10) (0.49) (0.75) (1.67) (0.51)
nrit -0.31 -0.62 -1.15 -1.64 -0.13 -0.37 -0.65 -0.11
(0.16) (0.34) (1.15) (1.33) (0.46) (0.59) (0.90) (0.45)
nmit -0.72
∗∗∗ -0.33 -1.48 -2.57 -0.26 -0.52 -0.94 -0.26
(0.12) (0.21) (1.10) (1.52) (0.35) (0.47) (0.97) (0.35)
∆sit 0.36
∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.81 0.38 0.70∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.88) (1.02) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.14)
Observations 1320 1320 880 880 1320 1320 1320 1320
Microregions 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Growth (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.69 0.13 0.64 0.22 0.12
Level (p-value) 0.03 0.73 0.53 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.33
All (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.21 0.05 0.37 0.03 0.14
Method OLS WG Diff. Diff. Sys. Sys. Sys. Sys.
Lagged Var. Pred. Pred. Pred. Pred. End. Lag 1
Instruments 17 14 32 26 24 30
Collapsed No Yes No Yes No No
Hansen-J p-value 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.28 0.13
Kleibergen-Paap LM 0.24 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00
Kleibergen-Paap rk F 0.94 0.97 5.58 5.69 1.29 5.39
Robust standard errors clustered by meso-regions in parentheses. Method indi-
cates which method is used: OLS, fixed effects (WG), Diff-GMM (Diff.), Sys-GMM
(Sys.). Lagged Var. indicates if lagged variables are treated as predetermined
(Pred.), endogenous (End.) or if only one lag is considered (Lag 1). Instruments
indicates the number of instruments and Collapsed whether they are collapsed or
not. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.6: Robustness: Column (6) Table 3.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln yit−1 0.66∗∗∗ -0.02 0.36 0.79∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.23) (0.32) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09)
ln pit−1 0.09 0.75∗∗ 2.05 0.91 0.47 0.39 -0.02 0.40
(0.12) (0.27) (1.07) (1.29) (0.51) (0.64) (1.07) (0.52)
lnwait−1 0.64∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 2.62 0.14 1.21∗ 1.21∗ 1.23 1.02
(0.24) (0.32) (1.78) (2.14) (0.51) (0.49) (0.70) (0.53)
sit−1 0.05∗ 0.04 -0.33 0.51 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.04
(0.02) (0.06) (0.47) (0.59) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
∆ ln kit 0.23
∗∗∗ 0.10 -0.05 0.21 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.33) (0.42) (0.20) (0.23) (0.28) (0.19)
∆ lnLit 0.51
∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 1.26 0.45 -0.04 0.26 -0.43 -0.06
(0.10) (0.17) (0.89) (1.13) (0.56) (0.63) (0.84) (0.56)
cbrit -0.68
∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗ -1.25 -1.77 -0.44 -0.61 -0.80 -0.45
(0.18) (0.34) (1.42) (1.21) (0.55) (0.54) (0.50) (0.53)
cdrit -0.56
∗∗ -0.30 0.67 1.37 -0.64 -0.52 -1.87 -0.73
(0.21) (0.42) (1.31) (1.06) (0.71) (0.85) (1.09) (0.71)
nmit -0.41
∗∗∗ -0.26 -1.55 -1.32 -0.04 -0.28 0.36 -0.03
(0.12) (0.19) (0.89) (0.95) (0.47) (0.51) (0.52) (0.48)
∆sit 0.28
∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.30 1.24 0.56∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.44∗ 0.53∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.54) (0.64) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.17)
Observations 1320 1320 880 880 1320 1320 1320 1320
Microregions 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Growth (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.36 0.21 0.52 0.05 0.17
Level (p-value) 0.08 0.49 0.33 0.64 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.47
All (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.15 0.05 0.23 0.01 0.08
Method OLS WG Diff. Diff. Sys. Sys. Sys. Sys.
Lagged Var. Pred. Pred. Pred. Pred. End. Lag 1
Instruments 20 16 37 29 29 35
Collapsed No Yes No Yes No No
Hansen-J p-value 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.16 0.24 0.19
Kleibergen-Paap LM 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00
Kleibergen-Paap rk F 0.98 1.24 6.16 6.35 1.12 6.49
Robust standard errors clustered by meso-regions in parentheses. Method indi-
cates which method is used: OLS, fixed effects (WG), Diff-GMM (Diff.), Sys-GMM
(Sys.). Lagged Var. indicates if lagged variables are treated as predetermined
(Pred.), endogenous (End.) or if only one lag is considered (Lag 1). Instruments
indicates the number of instruments and Collapsed whether they are collapsed or




CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
Government participation in economic activity is a vastly studied topic in
economics. The debate ranges from the optimal size of the public sector to
its optimal role in the economy. An undisputed fact in the literature is that
government participation in economies has been increasing throughout the
last century, especially before 1980 (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). If fact,
average general government spending as share of GDP for industrial countries
increased by a factor of 3.5 from 1913 to 1990 (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997).
Despite this recent rise in government size, the literature lacks consensus on
its relationship with economic development.
Empirically, economic growth and government size appears to have an in-
verted U-shaped relationship. The intuition for the so called Armey Curve1
is that for very low levels of government, the private sector would benefit
from protection of property rights, infrastructure, and other public goods.
However, eventually these benefits become lower than the costs imposed on
the private sector. The hypothesis was successfully tested in the empirical
literature (Grossman, 1988; Forte and Magazzino, 2010; Di Matteo, 2013),
although many other studies reveal a negative relationship between govern-
ment size and economic growth rather than a non-linear one (Scully, 1989;
Barro, 1991; Folster and Henrekson, 2001; Bergh and Karlsson, 2010). These
different outcomes may be driven by different choices of sample and measure-
ment errors, especially for lower income countries. That is why, according to
Bergh and Henrekson (2011), the consensus in the literature is that larger
governments are harmful to growth in developed countries.
While most of the literature focuses on the interplay between tax revenue
and public investment in either infrastructure or R&D (Barro, 1990; Romer,
1990; Aghion et al., 2016), I focus on the reallocation of skilled labor from the
1Named after Dick Armey (1995). Also referred to as the BARS curve after Barro
(1990), Armey (1995), Rahn and Fox (1996) and Scully (1994) or even the Scully Curve.
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private to public sector. Extending the Desmet and Parente (2010) model, I
study an economy where firms produce differentiated goods using only labor
that differs in quality as an input. Stronger competition leads to higher in-
centives for firms to invest in new technology. The government can increase
competition by reducing the fixed costs of production through simple regula-
tion, enforcing the rule of law, and other public goods.2 On the other hand,
the government dampens competition by crowding out the supply of human
capital in the private sector.
This paper is thus, related to the literature on the allocation of talent
(Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991; Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998). This
paper is not about misallocation of talent due to a public wage premium
as in the following studies. Cavalcanti and dos Santos (2018) analyze the
effect of occupational choice distorted by the government wage premium on
countries’ productivity through on-the-job accumulation of human capital.
The paper finds that a reduction in the Brazilian wage premium would result
in a sizable increase in output. Similarly, Jaimovich and Rud (2014) show
that the wage premium resulting from a bloated public sector leads to lower
profits and undermines private incentives to produce. My paper focus on
the competition between public and private sector on talent. Algan et al.
(2002) and Behar and Mok (2013) show evidence of this crowding-out effect
empirically.
Two closely related papers are Aghion et al. (2016) and Gomes and Kuehn
(2017). Aghion et al. (2016) is similar as it considers the productive role
of government and the relevance of the inefficient provision of public goods.
In contrast, they focus on taxation whereas I focus on the crowding-out
effect on the labor market. They also find an inverted U-shape relationship
between government size and growth. Gomes and Kuehn (2017) consider
the reallocation of human capital from the private to public sector, although
the government is not productive in their setting. Therefore, larger public
sectors always hinder economic growth as potential entrepreneurs become
civil servants.
An important feature in my model is the investment in new technology
undertaken by firms. It is incorporated as a cost in terms of skilled labor
in the sense that firms allocate a share of workers to research and devel-
2For instance, Klapper et al. (2006) shows that in industries where there are less bu-
reaucratic procedures, more new corporations are created.
59
opment. Rather than creating new technology, I assumed that firms adopt
technology from the frontier economy such that the marginal cost of adop-
tion is increasing with the proximity to the technology frontier (Barro and
Sala-i Martin, 1997; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2006). Relatedly, Griffith et al.
(2004) show that investments in R&D are instrumental to increasing the ab-
sorption capacity of firms, i.e., the ability of firms to copy new technology
from the frontier. They show that the gains from R&D investment would be
greater for countries further way from the frontier and question why we do
not observe higher levels of investment in R&D in less developed countries.
This paper sheds light on this issue suggesting that these countries have in-
efficient public sectors that crowd-out human capital from the private sector,
hindering competition and incentives to innovate.
In sum, the model presented here links technology adoption to the balance
between positive and negative effects of government activity. As government
competes for factor of production with private sector, public sector efficiency
is also an important factor. Efficient provision of public goods can lessen the
government needs for talents.3 I calibrate the model for European countries
to measure the cost of inefficient states. I find that the average gap in income
relative to the US in 30 years would be 87% instead of 74% if countries had
the same public sector efficiency as Finland, the country with higher public
efficiency in the sample.
The paper is structured as follows: After the introduction, I present some
motivating facts about public sector efficiency. Section 3 presents the model
relating government efficiency, government size and economic growth. In
section 4, I calibrate the model and quantify the cost of inefficient states on
economic growth. I conclude the paper in section 5.
4.1 Public Sector Size and Efficiency
I theorize that the effects of government size on economic growth depend on
(i) the ability of countries to reduce the costs of private production, and (ii)
the amount of resources – namely, human capital – it reallocates from the
3The effects of different levels of efficiency performed by the public sector on economic
activity has been studied vastly through the lens of corruption (Mauro, 1995; Brollo et al.,
2013), regulation (Rauch and Evans, 2000; Djankov et al., 2002), health and education
(Blankenau et al., 2007; Afonso and Aubyn, 2011).
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Figure 4.1: Share of raw and skilled labor allocated to the public sector
Note: Data from the Eurostat Census Data 2011. Raw labor is the ratio public
employees to the currently economically active population. Skilled labor is this same
fraction where both the numerator and denominator are adjusted for years of schooling
as in Caselli (2005) using Barro and Lee (2001) to achieve the years of schooling from
education attained.
private to public sector. The importance of government for the allocation of
human capital can be observed in Fig. 4.1. First note that, on average, 23%
of workers in the sample of European countries are allocated to the public
sector. More importantly, 28% of skilled labor is allocated to the production
of public goods. Note that, for all countries, the government attracts a higher
share of skilled labor than raw labor indicating that workers in the public
sector are more educated than workers in the private sector.
Civil servants perform activities that enhance the productivity of the pri-
vate sector by providing intermediate goods such as infrastructure that re-
duces the costs of transportation, law and order that enforces contracts and
reduce transaction costs, social safety net that reduces the cost of adjusting
labor, etc.
Measuring the efficiency of public sector is not a trivial exercise. I use
a composite index called “Public Sector Performance” (PSP) proposed by
Afonso et al. (2005) composed of four sub-indexes: Administration, Educa-
tion, Health and Stability. Each sub-index has equal weight. Administration
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encompasses measures of corruption, quality of the judiciary and regulation.
Education is composed of enrollment in secondary education and the per-
formance of students in math and science in international tests. The health
sub-index is composed of life expectancy and infant mortality. Lastly, eco-
nomic stability is composed of the levels of inflation and unemployment.
Each of these variables affect the performance of firms in the market. Firms
in countries with worse administration indexes will spend more resources on
non-productive activities such as tax compliance or bribes. Lower indexes
of education and health will affect the quality of human capital that firms
hire. Worse economic stability will make firms face higher uncertainty and
reallocate resource to insurance services.
Fig. 4.2 displays public sector performance for European countries. Larger
governments are able to provide better public goods, although this provision
suffers from diminishing returns. Within this pattern, efficiency varies across
countries. Take the example of Finland, France and Portugal. These coun-
tries have a similar share of human capital allocated to the public sector.
However, Finland provides better public goods than France and Portugal.
This inefficiency in the provision of public goods by the French and Por-
tuguese governments may reflect cultural features (Aghion et al., 2010), legal
origins (La Porta et al., 1999), clientelistic behavior (Robinson and Verdier,
2013), and other aspects of the societies. In this paper I take these differences
in public sector productivity as given. This allows the paper to focus on the
effects of such variations on economic growth
While Fig. 4.2 shows that there is substantial variation in the efficient
production of public goods across countries, Fig. 4.3 depicts the relationship
of public sector productivity and the distance to technology frontier – here
assumed to be the United States. Public sector efficiency is measured by
the share of PSP that is not explained by the amount of human capital
engaged in public service. I choose this kind of Solow residual instead of the
distance to the efficiency frontier in Fig. 4.2 to avoid sensitivity to outliers
and to the choice of convexity in the estimation of the frontier. Note that
countries such Greece, Hungary and Portugal, that have lower income per
capita relative to US and should have high gains from investment in new
method of production, are also countries with low levels of public efficiency.
The model presented here addresses this point, suggesting that countries who
would benefit the most from investment in innovation do not invest as much
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Figure 4.2: The production of public goods
Note: PSP is composed of Administration, Education, Health and Economic Stability.
Data for Administration components (“Ethics and Corruption”, “Burden of Government
Regulation” and “Under Influence”), Education components (“Quality of Math and
Science Education” and “Secondary Education Enrollment”), Health Components
(“Infant Mortality” and “Life Expectancy”), and the Economic Stability component
(“Inflation” is from the Global Competitiveness Index from the World Economic Forum
and “Unemployment” is from the International Monetary Fund). All variables are
averages from 2005 to 2015. Skilled Labor in the public sector is the share of human
capital in the public sector over total human capital in the economy computed as in
Fig. 4.1. The solid line represents the Efficiency Frontier computed by the Full Disposal
Hull method.
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Figure 4.3: The Solow residual in the production of public goods
Note: Income gap is the ratio of income per capita to the US income per capita. The
Public Sector Efficiency is the Solow residual in the production of public goods.
due to inefficiencies in the public sector.
4.2 Government, Market Size and Innovation
In this model economy I extend the varieties model implemented by Desmet
and Parente (2010, 2012) to include human capital as an input for production
and government as a productive sector. In this model consumers have a
most preferred variety and private firms produce one single variety of goods
and choose the amount of workers they will assign to the production of
new technology. Therefore, as competition increases and more varieties are
introduced in the market, firms face more sensitive demands for their goods,
reduce the prices and need to be more innovative in order to break even.
The government provides cost-saving services for private production using
workers as an input given its technology. The technology is determined by




The private firm is monopolistically competitive and uses only skilled labor
in its production function. The technology level is labor augmenting and
there is a fixed operating cost in terms of labor. The production technology
is given by
Qν = Aν [Hν − κν(g)], (4.1)




Note that the fixed cost can be divided into two terms. The first one is
variety-independent and a function of the pubic good g. The public goods
are cost-saving services provided by the government. I assume κ′(g) < 0,
κ′′(g) > 0 and limg→∞ κ = 0. Thus, κ(g) is a fixed cost in terms of human
capital that every firm, no matter the variety, must pay to produce. In other
words, κ(g) represents the amount of human capital that every firm must
spend to prepare its taxes, pay labor compensation or entry fees. Therefore,
the government provides public goods in the form of good market regulation
to reduce the number of nonproduction-skilled workers firms need to operate.
The second term in the equation regards the technology chosen by firms
through the size of innovation γν , given the cost of innovation φ. This part of
the fixed costs is also not productive directly; it measures how much human
capital each firm is spending in the production of new technologies, which
affects the production level indirectly. The firm’s technological level is given
by
Aν = (1 + γν)Ax,
where Ax is the benchmark technology, which is the average technology used
when the production starts. The variety-ν firm’s profit is given by







where Cν is the aggregate demand for variety ν and pν is its price. Firms pay
a wage per unit of human capital wx. The firm chooses price and the size
of technological innovation in order to maximize Eq. (4.2). The first order
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εν − 1 , (4.3)










where the inequality holds only for the case where γν is not an interior solu-
tion.
4.2.2 Households
Households are heterogeneous in the amount of human capital and their most
preferred variety. In the beginning of the period, households draw their most
preferred variety from a continuum of measure M distributed uniformly in a
circle with circumference one. Then, they draw their human capital from H







is the total amount of human capital in the economy. Note that the draws of
the most preferred variety and human capital are independent of each other,
which means that a high-skilled worker is as likely to prefer one kind of good
as an low-skilled worker. This assumption, although strong, helps us to focus
on the variation in the number of varieties instead of an unbalanced increase
in the number of skilled-workers-biased goods.
The household whose most preferred variety is ν˜ and whose human capital
is h chooses the amount of each variety and its job to maximize the following
utility function:










pνcν(h) ≤ (1− τ) [a(h)wg + (1− a(h))wxh] ,
where τ is the income tax and wg is the wage in the public sector. The
occupational choice is given by the variable a(h) = {0, 1}, where a(h) =
0 means that the households choose to work in the private sector. The
occupational choice depends on the wages offered and consequently on human
capital.
Therefore, the utility of the household is given by the amount of consump-
tion of the variety whose consumption, discounted by 1+dβν,ν˜ , is the greatest.
As illustrated by Fig. 4.4, dν,ν˜ is the arc-distance between the varieties ν and




Figure 4.4: Varieties circle
Note from the utility function that there is no reason why a household
would choose to consume a variety other than the one closest to its more
preferred variety in the circle. Therefore, the variety consumed by household
(ν˜, h) is
ν ′ = argmin[pν(1 + d
β
ν,ν˜)|ν ∈ V ],
where V is the set of varieties produced. Additionally, the individual demand




[a(h)wgh+ (1− a(h))wxh]. (4.6)
where, occupational choice is simply given by
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a(h) =
0 if wxh > wg;1 if wxh ≤ wg. (4.7)
Therefore, there are consumers supplying labor inelastically to either the
government or firms, depending on the level of human capital and the wages
households face.
4.2.3 Government
The government provides cost-saving services g using as an input the share of
human capital hp. The production function for the public sector is described
by the following technology:
g = F (hp).
Thus, the government provides only regulation services to improve the busi-
ness environment, i.e., the government is responsible for the production of
rule of law and protection of property rights. One may think about public
employees in this model as executing the same task as the public agent in
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998).
In their paper, the public agent is required to guarantee the well function-
ing of the market. However, depending on the quality of regulation, levels
of trust and other institutional characteristics of the society, the number of
public agents required to produce the same g may vary considerably. For
example, countries with more complicated regulation will require more pro-
cedures to start a business and, consequently, more civil servants to deal
with such procedures. However, given the number of procedures, more civil
servants ought to increase the production of public services. Therefore, the
production of the government is given by
g = zf(hp),
where z represents the institutional infrastructure in the economy and f(·)
is such that f ′(·) > 0 and f ′′(·) < 0. Lastly, assume that the government
pays to the civil servant the wage wg per unit of human capital. Thus, the
government budget is balanced and equals
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wghpH = τY, (4.8)
where Y is aggregate income.
4.2.4 Equilibrium
The aggregate demand for each variety depends on the amount of human
capital that demands each variety, which depends on the prices and distance
to the most preferred variety. I focus on the Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
where all varieties are equally spaced around the varieties circle, so that
d = 1/m. Then, the household who is indifferent between ν and νc is the one
located at distance dν from ν, such that
pc[1 + (d− dν)β] = pν [1 + dβν ]. (4.9)
Therefore, aggregating Eq. (4.6) for twice the fraction dν of the continuum
of households, since the condition above holds for both varieties neighboring

















The aggregate demand for variety ν depends on the measure dν , which,
in turn, changes with the price of variety ν according to the equilibrium
condition Eq. (4.9). Then, the price-elasticity of demand is
εν = 1 +
(1 + dν)
β[1 + (d− dv)β]
β(d− dν)β−1(1 + dβν )dν + βdβν [1 + (d− dν)β]
. (4.11)
The symmetric equilibrium is defined as
Definition 1 (Symmetric Equilibrium). The symmetric equilibrium is a vec-
tor of variety-dependent variables {pν , dν , εν , Qν , γν , Cν}ν∈V for all ν ∈ V and
a vector
{d, wx, wg, τ}
that satisfy:
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1. Firm maximization conditions Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4), and the zero profit
condition [Eq. (4.2)=0];
2. The aggregate demand Eq. (4.10);
3. The government balanced budget condition Eq. (4.8);
4. The symmetric equilibrium price condition Eq. (4.9);
5. The elasticity Eq. (4.11);
6. The good’s market clearing: Qν = Cν;
7. Labor market equilibrium wages: wx = wg; and
8. The labor market clearing: 1
d
Hν = (1− hp)H.
One can use Eqs. (4.8) and (4.10), and the labor market equilibrium wages,






This is similar to the effect proposed by Barro (1990) to explain the nega-
tive effect of government on economic growth. However, instead of reducing
the amount of savings, in this model the government reduces the aggregate
demand for firms’ products.
Additionally, using symmetry pc = pν and d = 2dν , and Eq. (4.11), we find
the elasticity equation











Lastly, market clearing together with the firm’s first order condition Eq. (4.4)
and the private production function yields the human capital demanded by
firm ν equal to Hν = κ(g)e












Government size affects the number of firms in two ways: the first it, negative
effect, is that it reduces the size of the market; the second, positive effect, is
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that it reduces the fixed costs of production. Then, the economy behaves as
follows: more firms increase the price elasticity of demand Eq. (4.13), which,
in turn, reduces the prices Eq. (4.3). With lower prices, firms need to produce
more to satisfy the zero profit condition, getting bigger in terms of produc-
tion. From Eq. (4.4), larger firms find it easier to invest in technological
innovation.
One can find the equilibrium equations for the model putting together
Eqs. (4.13) and (4.14) to find a negative relationship between elasticity and
innovation, and use the zero profit condition and Eq. (4.4) to find a positive
relationship














Therefore, there is an equilibrium value for the innovation process that sat-
isfies the following equation:
G(γν ; z, h





2β[(1 + γν)φ+ 1]
β+1 − (2β + 1)[(1 + γν)φ+ 1]β
}
and






The following proposition shows the relationship between innovation and the
quality of regulation:
Proposition 1. In a symmetric equilibrium, given the fraction of human
capital working in the public sector, an increase in the quality of regulation

















ν − 1) + φβεβ−1ν (εν − 1)
]
> 0,
where εν = (1 + γν)φ+ 1, and
Λz(z, h






since κ′(g) < 0. Then, the higher z is, the higher γν is for all values of z.
Intuitively, better regulation will imply lower fixed costs of operation,
higher price-elasticity and more competition. Firms will become larger in
terms of production and will engage in more innovation. In addition, we can
state the following about the relationship between government size and the
innovation process.
Proposition 2. Given the quality of regulation, if a public sector is unpro-
ductive, then a higher fraction of human capital in the government will reduce









Let η(z, hp, H) = (κ ◦ F )(z, hp, H) such that ηhp = κ′(g)zf ′(hp) < 0 and
ηhphp = z[zκ
′′(g)f ′(hp)2 + κ′(g)f ′′(hp)] > 0. Then
Λhp(z, h





η(z, hp, H)−2[2η(z, hp, H)+2(1−hp)Hηhp ].
If the public sector is unproductive in the sense that f ′(hp) = 0, then ηhp = 0,
which implies ΛH(z, h
p, H) < 0 and, consequently, that unproductive states
will harm the production of technology as they became bigger.
Also, note that the relationship between the share of human capital in the
public sector and the innovation level chosen by the firms depends on the
sign of
[η(z, hp, H) + (1− hp)Hηhp ].
For very low levels of hp there is little production of public goods and by
increasing it the country may reduce the fixed costs of operation which means
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that the second term would be bigger in absolute value than the first. Thus,
the effect of more human capital in the public sector would be positive for
the γν . However, for high levels of h
p the marginal benefit of a civil servant
is very small and the second term may be lower than the first. This leads to
a negative relationship between hp and γν .
4.2.5 Dynamics
None of the participants in the market face any dynamic choice. However,








Additionally, as the economy closes the income gap to the frontier of tech-
nology it is more costly to improve productivity (Barro and Sala-i Martin,
1997; Griffith et al., 2004). The response of innovation cost φ to the gap in
income is given by ηφ. Therefore, even though there is no dynamic choice for
agents in the economy, the law of motion of productivity and innovation cost
require agents to re-optimize every period. In other words, the dynamics of
the economy can be depicted as a sequence of steady states.
4.3 Calibration
In this section I calibrate the model. The goal here is twofold. First, I show
that the model predicts the empirical observation that government size has an
inverted-U shape relationship with economic growth. Second, I quantify the
losses of countries due to inefficient governments. Households have only one
parameter to be calibrated: The discount factor given to varieties different
than the most preferred variety β. I follow Desmet and Parente (2012) in the
calibration of this parameter using β = 0.5 matching Jaimovich and Floetotto
(2008) estimates of mark-ups. The firms have the variety-independent fixed
cost of production κ(g), which is set to match the average employees per
firm, and the cost of innovation φ set to match the growth rate of income
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Table 4.1: Model calibration: Country-independent parameters
Parameters Value Source
β 0.5 Match the mark-up estimates in Jaimovich
and Floetotto (2008)
ηκ -0.3 Optimum size of Government equal to 26%
(Di Matteo, 2013)
ηφ 0.04 Response of growth rate to income gap (Grif-
fith et al., 2004)
α 0.5 Slope coefficient δ1
per capita. The government production function is assumed to be
g = z(hp)α,
where z is the “Solow residual” and α is the slope coefficient of the regression
equation
log(PSPi) = δ0 + δ1 log(h
p
i ) + ωi.
We still need to calibrate the response of κ(g) to changes in g denoted by ηκ
and the response of φ to changes in the gap denoted ηhp . The latter is set to
ηφ = 0.04 since the elasticity between φ and γ is −1 and Griffith et al. (2004)
find the elasticity of the growth rate to the gap equals −0.04. In addition,
note that ηhp = αηκ.The response of fixed costs of production to public goods
ηκ defines the optimum size of government, given the public sector production
function. Then, we use the finding of Di Matteo (2013) where the optimum
size of government spending is equal to 26% of total income to calibrate ηκ.
It turns out that the optimum size of public employment is around 15%. The
calibration of country-independent parameters is summarized in Table 4.1.
Fig. 4.5 displays examples of the Armey curves for the United Kingdom,
Ireland and Denmark. All the countries in the sample have passed the opti-
mum level of government which explains why most of the empirical literature
finds a negative correlation between government and growth (Bergh and Hen-
rekson, 2011). The United Kingdom has 30% of human capital allocated to
the public sector and grows at an average rate of 1.06%. If at the optimal
size of government, the United Kingdom would be growing at 2%. Ireland’s
size of public employment is closer to the optimum with growth rate similar
to the United Kingdom. However, given the high efficiency of the Irish public
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(a) United Kingdom (b) Ireland
(c) Denmark
Figure 4.5: Armey curves
Note: The solid vertical line represents the actual level of public employment for these
countries. The dashed line illustrates the optimum level of public employment according
to estimates of Di Matteo (2013)
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sector, Ireland could boost its growth rate by only 0.2% if public employ-
ment were reduced roughly 10%. Denmark is one of the countries with the
largest government (36%) and with a small growth rate (0.2%). Also, the
efficiency of the public sector is relatively high. Then, a reduction of public
employment to 15% would improve the growth rate by 0.9%.
Now, I use the model calibrated to perform the following exercise: what
would be the gap of income to the US in the countries in our sample if they
had the highest efficiency in the sample? That is, how fast would they grow
if their public sector could produce public goods as efficiently as Finland?
However, we need to be careful when linking GDP per capita in the data and
the variables in the model. The income per capita of country i at time t with
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t be the industrial production
of country i in time t, then we have that the growth rate of income per capita


























= Iˆ it ,
(4.16)
where rExpit is the ratio of government spending to industrial production. As
can be shown in the model, the growth rate of industrial production is γt, the
same rate by which wages of private firms grow. Therefore, if governments
want to keep the same amount of employees they must increase public wages
at same rate as private wages, which makes government spending grow at
the same rate as industrial production. Thus, rExpit = rExp
i is treated as a
constant.
The results are displayed in Table 4.2. Note that the change in the gap
depends also on the growth rate of the US. We set this value to 0.9% according
to the average growth rate of the US from 2005 to 2015 from the World Bank.
Therefore, most of the countries in the sample would have their distance to
US increased since they grow at lower rates. Portugal, Italy and Greece
have negative growth rates, however, the increase of public efficiency would
lead those countries to perform better than the US. While Greece and Italy
would be able to maintain their gaps relative to the US instead of widen
them, Portugal would close the gap to 11% if the public sector were able
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Table 4.2: Calibration of country-dependent parameters and numerical
exercise
Country hp H z φ κ γ γ∗ Gap0 Gap30 Gap∗30
HUN 0.26 1.64 2.38 1.10 76.31 2.12 3.22 0.44 0.55 0.67
PRT 0.28 1.57 2.49 1.31 10.17 -0.01 1.81 0.54 0.46 0.65
GRC 0.26 1.87 2.51 1.14 66.34 -0.05 0.98 0.58 0.49 0.59
ITA 0.23 9.73 2.65 1.32 65.79 -0.59 0.88 0.74 0.56 0.74
SWE 0.35 2.10 2.66 1.24 18.68 1.32 2.62 0.84 0.91 1.16
ESP 0.24 8.30 2.69 1.34 43.65 0.39 1.90 0.67 0.61 0.81
BGR 0.19 1.35 2.75 1.09 50.37 4.21 4.99 0.27 0.49 0.56
BEL 0.34 1.93 2.80 1.31 10.82 0.65 1.87 0.81 0.78 0.97
NOR 0.38 1.00 2.82 1.18 16.50 0.63 1.48 1.26 1.20 1.40
GBR 0.30 14.17 2.93 1.58 20.96 1.06 2.44 0.74 0.76 0.99
DNK 0.36 1.25 3.04 1.18 22.89 0.21 0.79 0.88 0.78 0.86
FRA 0.28 11.40 3.19 1.60 17.06 0.49 1.38 0.74 0.69 0.81
AUT 0.24 1.70 3.40 1.14 49.30 0.95 1.21 0.85 0.86 0.90
DEU 0.27 18.05 3.40 1.54 32.13 1.19 1.73 0.81 0.85 0.95
IRL 0.26 0.80 3.45 1.19 12.76 0.94 1.22 0.93 0.94 0.99
NLD 0.29 3.38 3.50 1.56 5.64 0.60 1.01 0.90 0.85 0.92
FIN 0.28 1.10 3.86 1.15 28.33 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.78 0.78
Note: hp is the fraction of human capital working in the public sector from Eurostat
Census Data 2011, H is the stock of human capital measured by h¯ ∗ L, where h¯ is the
average human capital in the economy computed as in Caselli (2005) using information
about years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2001), and L is the labor force from the
World Bank. z is the efficiency of the public sector computed as the Solow residual from
government production. The cost of innovation φ is calibrated to match growth rate γ
and κ matches the average workers in firms from OECD adjusted by h¯. Gap 0 is the
income gap between countries and the US in 2010 while Gap30 is the gap after 30 year in
case phi changes with the gap according to ηφ. Variables with
∗ represent the values of
those variables if the efficiency of the countries were equal to the efficiency of Finland.
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to produce public goods as efficiently as Finland. The United Kingdom,
Germany and Belgium are examples of relatively rich economies that could
converge in income to the US in 30 years in the case of improvements to
public sector efficiency. Otherwise, those countries would roughly keep their
relative distance to US. The United Kingdom would increase growth rates
by 1.38%, Germany by 0.54% and Belgium by 0.85%. Countries further
way from the frontier like Hungary and Bulgaria have a higher growth rate
than the US. More efficient governments would help them to close the gap
faster. Hungary would increase its growth rate by 1.20% and Bulgaria would
enhance theirs by 0.72%.
In general, the inefficiency of the public sector is able to explain why some
European countries are falling behind the US, why others seem to have con-
verged in terms of technology adoption while they are still below the frontier,
and how developing countries could reach the frontier faster. Additionally,
the average income gap to the US would remain roughly constant in thirty
years if countries keep growing the actual average rates. However, if countries
in the sample were able to produce public goods as efficiently as Finland, the
average gap would reduce to 12%.
4.4 Conclusion
As government size increases more and more resources are reallocated from
the private to public sector, reducing the size of the market and the size of
firms in terms of production. Smaller firms do have incentives to invest in
new methods of production, harming the economic growth of the countries.
Therefore, the public sector must be efficient in the provision of public goods
used to reduce firms’ fixed costs of operation. If the government is unproduc-
tive the only effect that bigger governments can have on economic growth is
negative.
In this paper I have modeled an economy where governments reduce the
fixed cost of firms and use human capital available in the economy. Two
important results from the model are that lower public sector productivity
harms private investment in technology and, even if the public sector is ef-
ficient, hiring workers when the public sector is already big may be more
harmful than helpful. These results stress how important it is to combat cor-
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ruption, clientelistic behavior, poor regulation and other kind of inefficiencies
that can happen in the public sector.
The calibration exercise shows that public sector inefficiencies may be re-
sponsible for an average income gap that is 12% wider for European countries
when compared to the US. We believe that this gains could be larger for de-
veloping countries because: (i) they have greater benefits from investment
in innovation since they are further way from the frontier, and (ii) develop-
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